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List of All Parties to the Proceeding
The following were the original parties in the proceeding below:
Plaintiff:

Brighton Corporation

Defendants: Isabel M. Coats, Walter M. Coats, Gregory M. Ward, and Doug's
Tree Service, Inc.
Gregory M. Ward acquired the property that is the subject of this action from
Isabel M. Coats and Walter M. Coats subsequent to the commencement of the action.
Thereafter, no claims were prosecuted by the plaintiff against the Coats or Doug's Tree
Service, and the plaintiff Brighton Corporation and the defendant Gregory M. Ward were
the only parties in the case at the trial of this matter. Mr. Ward also represents the interest
of his family through the entity, Brighton Group. Brighton Group has an interest in the
property.
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vii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the conditional proposed

settlement presented by the parties to the court constituted a binding and enforceable
contract and settlement agreement. This issue was preserved in the trial court by Ward's
Objection to the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 1315-82). Standard of
Review: Whether a contract exists is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness giving
no deference to the trial court's determination of the issues presented. Herm Hughes &
Sons. Inc. v. Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing Brighton to pave a private roadway

across Ward's property and whether Brighton should be ordered to remove the paved
roadway and restore Ward's property to its original condition. Brighton's motion to pave
the roadway was granted without notice or an opportunity for Ward to be heard.
However, Ward did file an objection to the proposed order, which objections were denied.
See Objection to Proposed Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private Roadway (R. 12841306). Standard of Review: This issue revolves around whether the pavement of the
private roadway was allowed by a contract between the parties (i.e., the proposed
settlement agreement). Whether a contract exists is a conclusion of law reviewed for
1

correctness giving no deference to the trial court's determination of the issues presented.
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling on summary judgment (1) that Ward

must compensate Brighton for all further costs, including attorney's fees, associated with
any review by Brighton of any new plans submitted by Greg Ward as a condition of
reviewing those plans; (2) that it was reasonable for Brighton to require a licensed
architect to sign any plans for the cabin as a condition of reviewing any plans; and (3) that
it was reasonable for Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone
ordinance of Salt Lake County in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. This issue was
preserved below by Ward's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (R. 881960). Standard of Review: Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a
conclusion of law reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's
determination of the issues presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235
(Utah 1993); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
4.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to consider at trial the latest set of

plans submitted to Brighton by Ward. The Court ruled over Ward's objection that it
would not consider the latest set of plans submitted to Brighton by Ward. (Trial
Transcript, Vol. 1., R. 1750:32-50). Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation
and application of the unambiguous terms of the November 3, 1999 Order which set forth
the issues to be tried should be reviewed under the same standard as the interpretation of
2

an unambiguous contract, that is, as a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness giving
no deference to the trial court's determination of the issues presented. Saunders v. Sharp,
806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991).
5.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling at the trial of this matter that the plans

submitted by Ward were properly rejected by Brighton. This was the issue tried by the
court and was preserved below during the entire trial proceeding. (Trial Transcripts,
Vols. 1-3, R. 1750-52). Standard of Review: The trial court's determination that approval
of the plans had not been unreasonably withheld constitutes the interpretation of a
contract that is reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's
determination of the issues presented. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah
1991).
6.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Carl Eriksson, who was

both an expert witness and a fact witness, to testify at the trial of this matter. This issue
was preserved at trial through Ward's objection to the trial court's disallowance of the
testimony of Carl Eriksson (Trial Transcript, Vol. I, R. 1750:224-30) and Ward's Motion
to Reconsider Disallowance of Testimony of Carl Eriksson (R. 1533-45) which was
denied. Standard of Review: The admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
7.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Ward's application for

determination that consent to build the cabin had been unreasonably withheld after the
July 13, 1995 evidentiary hearing. This issue was preserved for trial throughout the
3

hearing held on this issue (Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing, R. 1753). Standard of
Review: The trial court's determination that approval of the plans had not been
unreasonably withheld constitutes the interpretation of an unambiguous contract that is
reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's determination of the
issues presented. Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991V
8.

Whether the trial court erred in not recusing Judge David S. Young for bias

and prejudice and whether the Supreme Court should order that Judge David S. Young be
recused from this action for bias and for denying Ward his due process rights tliroughout
the proceedings below. This issue was preserved through Ward's Motion Requesting
Recusal and Reassignment (R. 651-77) and Ward's objections to the trial court's rulings.
Standard of Review: The refusal to recuse Judge Young is a legal conclusion reviewed
for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The constitutionality of a
trial court's actions are considered conclusions of law reviewed for correctness. State v.
Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991) (in the criminal context reviewing whether trial court
had substantially complied with constitutional requirements for entry of guilty plea).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

4

Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
Every person is competent to testify to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
A witness may not testify as to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of
the matter.
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1997)
Whenever a party . . . shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any
opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein,
except to call another judge to hear and determine the matter. Every
affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or
prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has
been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known
No party shall be
entitled in any case to file more than one affidavit....
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E.1
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . .
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.
Utah Constitution. Article L § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves the attempt by Gregory M. Ward ("Ward") an owner of real

property in Brighton, Utah to build a family cabin on his property (the "Property"). The
Property is subject to restrictions in a Special Warranty Deed that provide that the
Property "shall be limited to the construction of a single residential building containing
not in excess of twelve hundred square feet on each floor, and not containing more than
two floors." Special Warranty Deed (Trial Exhibit 44) (attached as Exhibit A to
Addendum). The Special Warranty Deed also gives Brighton Corporation ("Brighton"),
an adjoining landowner, the right to review and approve plans for the cabin and provides
that Brighton shall give such approval in a "timely" manner and not unreasonably
withhold such approval. Id. This is an appeal from judgment of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, after bench trial, and from the prior interlocutory orders
entered by the court, all related to Brighton's refusal to approve Ward's plans for a cabin.
B.

Course of Proceedings in the Trial Court
This action was filed by Brighton on August 29, 1994, seeking, among other

things, to enjoin Ward from building a cabin on his property without approval from
Brighton. Complaint (R. 1-19). A hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction was
held on September 26, 1994 (Transcript at R. 1742). The Court entered a preliminary
injunction preventing the defendant Ward from proceeding with the construction of his

6

cabin or even obtaining a building permit without approval from Brighton. October 4,
1994 Order 308-16). Ward does not appeal that ruling.
Ward subsequently submitted revisions of the 1994 plans to Brighton in an attempt
to obtain approval to build his cabin. The revised plans submitted by Ward contained
only two floors and no more than 1,200 square feet on each floor in compliance with the
Special Warranty Deed. See Application for Determination that Approval Has Been
Unreasonably Withheld. (R. 317 - 420). Nevertheless, Brighton refused to approve the
plans. On July 13, 1995, the Court denied a motion by Ward requesting an order that
Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the plans. See August 15, 1995 Order.
(R. 467) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit G).
Ward submitted new plans to Brighton for approval after the July 1995 hearing.
These plans also complied with the "two floors" and "1,200 square feet" requirements.
Nevertheless, Brighton refused to approve the plans. (See, e.g. Affidavit of Mary Barton,
R. 501 - 524). Ward filed a renewed motion for an order that Brighton was unreasonably
withholding approval. (R. 468-70). However, the Court refused to hear Ward's motion,
ruling that Ward would have to proceed to trial. June 25, 1996 Order (R. 612-13).
On or about May 16, 1997, Ward filed a motion requesting the recusal of Judge
Young based on the fact that Brighton's counsel played an active and advertised role in
Judge Young's retention election campaign in 1996. (R. 651-53). The court denied the
motion. See June 9, 1997 Minute Entry (R. 718-21) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit H).
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On December 22,1998, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment
requesting that the Court rule as a matter of law (1) that Ward must compensate Brighton
for all further costs, including attorney's fees, associated with any review by Brighton of
any new plans submitted by Greg Ward as a condition of reviewing those plans; (2) that it
was reasonable for Brighton to require a licensed architect to sign any plans for the cabin;
and (3) that it was reasonable for Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay
Zone ordinance of Salt Lake County in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. (R. 802-04).
The Court granted the summary judgment motion in an order dated March 3, 1999. (R.
1185-88) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit I).
Trial was scheduled for March 3, 1999. (R. 1005). On that day the parties
informed the Court of a proposed conditional settlement. The parties requested and
obtained a new trial date in the event the settlement was not accomplished. On
September 3, 1999, Brighton filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. (R. 119799). In this motion, Brighton requested that the trial court allow it to pave the gravel
roadway running across Ward's property in violation of the Property Use Agreement's
requirement that the road remain a gravel road. The court granted Brighton's motion in
chambers on September 8, 1999, before Ward had an opportunity to respond to the
motion. See Affidavit of Douglas J. Parry in Support of Petition for Emergency
Extraordinary Writ ("Parry Aff.") at 1fl| 9-13 ( f i l e d i n Appellate Case No. 990845)
(attached to Addendum as Exhibit J). The court's ruling was reflected in a September 21,
1999 order. (R. 1392 - 94) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit K).
8

On November 3,1999, the court entered an order holding that the parties had
entered into a binding settlement agreement and that the trial scheduled for November 1718, 1999, would be on the issue of whether the plans submitted by Ward to Brighton after
the hearing on March 3, 1999, complied with the settlement agreement. See November 3,
1999 Order (R. 1417 - 18) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit L).
C.

Disposition in the Court Below
Trial was held on November 17-19, 2000. The trial court ruled, among other

things, that the trial would be held on whether plans submitted by Ward in June 1999
complied with the conditional settlement agreement. The court refused to consider later
plan revisions that had been submitted by Ward on October 6, 1999 (the "October 1999
Plans"). The court held that the June plans did not comply with the conditional settlement
agreement and that Brighton properly refused to consider the October 1999 Plans. See
February 3, 2000 Order (R. 1690 -92) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit M).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Background
In 1941 Fred and Sarah Moreton (Ward's grandparents) acquired real property in

Brighton, Utah. See, e.g.. Transcript of September 6, 1994 hearing (R. 1743:44-45;
1743:75). The Moretons built a family cabin on the property. Id, In 1969, the Moretons
placed the property into Brighton Corporation, their family corporation, and gave onefifth of the stock of the corporation to each of their children-Mary Barton, Isabel Coats
(Wardfs mother), Ed Moreton, Fred Moreton, and Sarah Kunz. (R. 1743:46-47; 1743:75).
9

In July 1990, the five children decided to divide and distribute the assets of
Brighton Corporation among themselves. (R. 1743:47; 1743:75). The real property was
valued at approximately $265,000. The property was divided into three parcels—the main
parcel, which included the existing family cabin, and two adjoining parcels. (R. 1743:48;
1743:75). The adjoining parcels were to be subjected to certain restrictive covenants. (R.
1743:49). The children drew lots and, in accordance with the draw, one child chose the
main parcel, two children chose the two adjoining parcels with some cash, and the other
two children chose to receive $53,000 in cash. (R. 1743:48-49; 1743:75).
Mary Barton drew the first lot and chose the main parcel. (R. 1743:49). Mary
Barton is, for all purposes, Brighton Corporation. (R. 1743:4; 1743:75). Isabel M. Coats
acquired the adjoining parcel of property to the west of the main parcel (the "Property")
by Special Warranty Deed executed on July 3, 1991. (R. 1743:50; 1743:75; Trial Exhibit
44).l A Property Use Agreement was also entered into by the parties on July 3, 1991.
(See Trial Exhibit 45). The Appellant Gregory M. Ward acquired the Property from his
mother, Isabel M. Coats, in August 1994. (R. 1743:207). This litigation was commenced
in August 1994 by Brighton Corporation (Mary Barton) to enforce the restrictions in the
Special Warranty Deed against her nephew, Gregory M. Ward.
B.

The Restrictive Covenants
The Special Warranty Deed provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

]

Mary Barton was the grantor of deed to the property acquired by Isabel M. Coats.
10

BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. The above-described premises shall be
limited to the construction of a single residential building containing not in
excess of twelve hundred square feet on each floor, and containing not more
than two floors....
Grantor expressly reserves the right to review and approve the proposed
placement, plans, and designs for any improvement to be located upon the
above-described property, which approval shall be timely and shall not be
unreasonable withheld.
Trial Exhibit No. 44 (attached to Addendum as Exhibit A).
The Property Use Agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
. . . the designated 20 foot right-of-way as described on the deed from
Brighton to Coats as used for roadway purposes shall consist of a single
lane gravel roadway for vehicular travel....
Property Use Agreement (Trial Exhibit No. 45) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit B).
C.

Facts Related to Specific Issues on Appeal
The following Statement of Facts is organized by the facts relevant to each of the

issues on appeal.
Issue 1:

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the conditional proposed
settlement presented by the parties to the court constituted a binding and
enforceable contract and settlement agreement.

On March 3, 1999, the parties in this case informed the trial court that they were
contemplating a settlement of this action. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745) (attached
to Addendum as Exhibit C). The genesis of the proposed settlement began with an
October 28, 1998 letter sent by Brighton to Ward proposing a manner of resolving the
dispute between the parties and requesting that Ward make certain revisions to prior

11

plans. October 28, 1998 letter (Trial Exhibit No. 2) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit
D). Ward submitted plans to Brighton on February 5, 1999.
On February 22, 1999, Brighton sent a letter to Ward rejecting those plans for
three general reasons: (1) the plans were allegedly incomplete and lacked necessary
detail; (2) the plans allegedly did not adequately clarify the design of the north porch of
the cabin; and (3) the patio on the south side of the cabin "might" have required what
Brighton believed to be an excessive cut in the property. February 22, 1999 letter (Trial
Exhibit No. 3) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit E).
Ward's counsel responded on February 25, 1999, explaining that the claimed
"deficiencies" were not deficiencies at all, but stating that Ward "believe[s] that these
three issues can be resolved," and that Ward would submit revised plans to attempt to
address Brighton's concerns. See February 25, 1999 letter from Douglas J. Parry to
James S. Jardine (R. 1252-54). On March 2, 1999, Brighton's counsel acknowledged that
the settlement discussion was merely a proposal, stating that "[i]n an effort to see if this
matter can be settled prior to trial, I am writing to clarify our understanding of our
discussions on a proposed settlement." March 2, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to
Douglas J. Parry (emphasis added) (R. 1256-58). See also Brighton's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 1400)
("Brighton agrees that the proposal stated in the March 2, 1999 letter was only a proposal,
i.e., it was not accepted on that day.").
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The October 28,1998 letter specifically provided that "any settlement must be
fully and completely documented and incorporated in an order of the Court that includes
all approved plans

" October 28, 1998 letter at 2 (Trial Exhibit No. 2). Likewise, the

March 2, 1999 letter from Brighton's counsel indicated that "it is essential that final
plans, if approved, be included and incorporated into the Court's final order." March 2,
1999 letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (R. 1258).
On March 3, 1999, the parties informed the Court of the proposed settlement. The
parties requested and obtained a trial date at the end of April 1999 in the event the
settlement was not accomplished. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:4, 25). The
following excerpts from the record establish that a settlement had not yet been reached,
and would only be reached on the satisfaction of actions that remained to be taken.
MR. JARDINE: It, in fact, Your Honor, is a conditional settlement wefd
like to read into the record. It's conditional because certain actions remain
to be taken. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:3, lines 17-19) (emphasis
added).
MR. JARDINE: We propose to state the agreement on the record and then
to formalize it later in an order for the Court to sign, if the remaining issues
and actions are satisfactorily resolved. And we would ask the Court to
continue the trial date, and I think Mr. Parry will speak to that. WeVe
agreed that we will review the contemplated plans to be submitted to us,
within seven days of receiving them, and I think Mr. Parry will ask you
about available trial dates within that time frame. Id at 3-4 (emphasis
added).
MR. JARDINE: There remains an issue outstanding that the future plans
submitted to us will address, which is the location and design of the porch
or front entrance proposed on the north side. Id at 5, lines 15-16 (emphasis
added).
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MR. JARDINE: " . . . if the issues raised in the letters of October 28, 1998,
and February 22, 1999, and the noted ambiguities are addressed and
resolved . . . [Brighton will not] disapprove the plans." Id. at 6, lines 11-15
(emphasis added).
MR. JARDINE: There are other issues to address in terms of the proposed
settlement. A term of the proposed settlement is that Mr. Ward will
withdraw all plans filed to date with the county . . . . Id. at 6, lines 16-19
(emphasis added).
MR. JARDINE: Next, with regard to Brighton Corporation's waterline
easement, which comes across the property, the proposed resolution is that
the claim of trespass and relocation would be dismissed, if everything else
is resolved . . . Id. at 10, lines 20-23 (empnasis added).
MR. JARDINE: I understand that if all of this is achieved and
accomplished and finally resolved, that all other claims between the parties
would be dismissed and that a final order would be entered with the Court,
setting forth all of the terms of the settlement, attaching the plans, . . . . Id.
at 13, lines 6-10 (emphasis added).
MR. JARDINE: One of the issues is whether the road would be paved. It's
our understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the road, at
Brighton Corporation's expense. Id. at 15, lines 16-19 (emphasis added).
MR. PARRY: My only other thing is the time for trial, if necessary. I'm
hoping that you'll have two days sometime in late April or early May. Id. at
17, lines 5-7.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about that. Let me ask you this-when
would you be aware of whether you might want those days? How soon?
Id at 17, lines 10-12.
THE COURT: Thank you each. All right, based then upon that stipulation,
the Court will strike the trial date anticipating, hopefully, that the whole
matter will be resolved upon this stipulation. The Court has continued a
trial date, in anticipation that the matter will be resolved, however, to April
29 and 30. if needed, for the trial. All right? Id. at 25, lines 1-7 (emphasis
added).
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Ward agreed to settle this matter on the condition that Brighton approve his plans
in time for him to start construction in the 1999 building season. Affidavit of Greg Ward
("Ward Aff") (R. 1365). See also March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:17-18) (Wardfs
counsel requested a trial date before June 1999 so that Ward could build in 1999). Ward
testified that he believed that the settlement was a conditional proposal. Trial Transcript,
Vol. II (R. 1751:453). Ward also relied on Brighton's representations that a prior survey
(the "Sneidman" survey) was accurate. See October 28, 1998 letter at 3. An updated
survey conducted after March 3, 1999, revealed that the Sneidman survey was not
accurate. See Updated Survey (Trial Exhibit No. 46).
Ward subsequently submitted revised plans to Brighton in April 1999 (hereinafter
the "April 1999 Plans"). Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:59, lines 11-13; Trial
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:348). At Brighton's request, Ward supplemented those plans
in June 1999 (hereinafter the "June 1999 Supplements").2 Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R.
1750:61, lines 12-17). Ward's architect, Kimble Shaw, testified at trial that Brighton's
counsel informed him that if he produced the supplemental drawings, the parties would
then have a settlement. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:350-51).

2

At trial, Mary Barton referred to the April 1999 Plans as "Preliminary Plans" and
the June 1999 Supplements as "Final Plans." Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:56).
However, Kimble Shaw explained that the June 1999 plans were "supplementary
drawings" with information organized in a different manner according to a specific
request by Brighton. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:344-350). The two plans were
meant to be read together.
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Brighton refused to approve Ward's plans. See June 23, 1999 letter from James S.
Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 13). Ward determined that Brighton was
not acting in good faith to reach a settlement and informed Brighton's counsel that there
was no use in pursuing settlement discussions any further and that the parties should
prepare for trial. See July 7, 1999 letter from Douglas J. Parry to James S. Jardine (Trial
Exhibit No. 35; R. 1272). Brighton responded by filing a Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement. (R. 1197). On October 22, 1999, the Court granted Brighton's motion,
ruling that the stipulation stated by counsel on the record on March 3, 1999, constituted a
binding and enforceable contract and that the terms of the contract were stated in the
March 3, 1999 hearing and the documents incorporated therein (i.e., the letters and the
checklists). Nov. 3, 1999 Order (R. 1417-18). See also Feb. 3, 2000 Order (R. 1690-91).
Prior to the March 3, 1999 hearing, the trial court had granted a motion for partial
summary judgment in which the trial court ordered that Ward must compensate Brighton
for all further costs , including attorney's fees, associated with any review of new plans
submitted by Ward to Brighton. March, 3, 1999 Order (R. 1185-88). The payment of
costs and attorney's fees as a condition of review is not mentioned in the proposed
settlement. See Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:280-81) (James S. Jardine admits that
the settlement "is silent" on the issue of attorney's fees). Nevertheless, after the March 3,
1999 hearing, Brighton continued to claim that Ward must pay Brighton's costs and
attorney's fees associated with Brighton's review of future plans. See, e.g. June 23, 199
letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry at 5 (Trial Exhibit No. 13) ("Based on the
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earlier order of partial summary judgment, Brighton will be submitting an invoice for
costs incurred in plan review); July 28, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J.
Parry (R. 1413; Trial Exhibit No. 36) (requesting payment of $5,446.50 in attorney's
fees); October 11, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to James K. Tracy (Trial Exhibit No.
37) (stating that Brighton will not review further plans until its past fees and costs are
paid); October 26, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to James K. Tracy (Trial Exhibit No.
38) (asking for payment of an additional $3,499.00 in fees). Ward did not understand or
agree that payment of cost and attorney's fees was a part of the proposed conditional
settlement. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:457-58).3
Ward understood that the proposed settlement incorporated by reference the terms of the
October 28, 1998 letter and the February 22, 1999 letter and that Brighton would not
approve his plans if he did not correct his plans as suggested by Brighton. Testimony of
Gregory Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:495-96).
Issue 2:

Whether the trial court erred in allowing Brighton to pave a private roadway
across Ward's property

Brighton's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement included a request that
Brighton be allowed to pave the gravel roadway running across Ward's property. (R.
1197-99). The trial court had found in 1994 that the purpose of the restrictive covenants,
including the Property Use Agreement, was
3

Ward made clear that his reference to a "settlement agreement" at trial was in
recognition of the trial court's ruling, and that he was not conceding that he believed the
conditional proposed settlement was in reality a binding settlement agreement. (R. 1751:
454).
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to preserve the private nature of plaintiff s cabin and the rustic nature of the
surrounding lands, including the Subject Property [and] to limit the
intrusion of high traffic . . . from the Subject Property . . . .
October 4, 1994 Order at If 8 (R. 312).
Ward agreed that if the parties were able to settle this matter and Brighton
approved his plans, Brighton could pave the gravel roadway. March 3, 1999 Transcript at
15 (R. 1745:15) (Mr. Jardine stated that "[i]t's our understanding that if this goes through,
we [Brighton] would pave the road."). On August 5, 1999, Brighton's counsel wrote to
Ward's counsel as follows regarding pavement of the roadway:
We also recognize that the Property Use Agreement refers to the roadway
easement as a "gravel" roadway. Accordingly, we agree that until the issue
is resolved, as a practical matter, Brighton can pave the road this year only
with your client's agreement.
August 5, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagan to Douglas J. Parry (attached as Exhibit B to
Ward's Objection to Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private Roadway) (R. 1360).
A scheduling conference was held on September 8, 1999. At that time, Ward's
counsel was not aware that Brighton had filed the Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement, with the accompanying request to pave the road across Ward's Property.4
Affidavit of Douglas J. Parry (Exhibit H to Ward's Petition for Emergency Extraordinary
Writ) ("Parry Aff") atffif10-12. At the scheduling conference, Brighton informed the
court that it had filed the motion a few days earlier. The trial court granted the motion
September 3, 1999, the date the motion was filed, was the Friday prior to the
Labor Day weekend. Brighton served the motion by mail, and with there being no mail
delivery on Labor Day, Ward's counsel did not receive the motion until after the
scheduling conference on September 8, 1999. Parry Aff. at ^ 10, 12.
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allowing pavement of the roadway over Ward's objection that he had no notice or an
opportunity to be heard on the matter. Id. at ^ff 11, 13; September 21, 1999 Order (R.
1392-94).
Ward sought an extraordinary writ from this Court to prevent pavement of the
roadway on his land. However, Brighton paved the roadway before this Court could act
on the petition. See October 18, 1999 Remand Motion Results, Case No. 990845
(denying Petition for Extraordinary Writ because "issue raised is moot inasmuch as the
road has already been constructed.").
Issue 3:
a.

Whether the trial court erred in granting Brighton's summary judgment motion
Brighton's evidence. Brighton reviewed plans submitted by Ward on

several occasions. On each occasion, Brighton disapproved the plans. Affidavit of Mary
M. Barton ("Barton Aff") at f 2 (R. 871-73). Mary Barton stated in her affidavit that one
consistent problem on each occasion was that the plans submitted by Ward "were
ambiguous, making it impossible to determine with confidence whether the plans were
compliant." Id at ^ 3. At the first hearing in this case in 1994, the trial court found that
Ward's plans were intentionally ambiguous. Judge's Ruling, September 7, 1994 (R.
1742:4). Mr. Ward continued to submit plans that Mary Barton deemed to be
"incomplete and ambiguous, and that make only slight changes from versions already
rejected." Barton Aff. at f 6. Brighton's costs for legal counsel, and other costs incident
to its review of Mr. Ward's plans had exceeded $60,000." Id. at^| 5.
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b.

Ward's evidence. After the trial court upheld Brighton's rejection of

Ward's plans on October 4, 1994, Ward subsequently submitted to Brighton revisions of
those plans to Brighton on October 26, 1994 and March 9, 1995. (See July 13, 1995
Hearing Exhibits Nos.l, 4). Ward's plans were filed with and approved by Salt Lake
County as meeting all county building and zoning requirements. See July 13, 1995
Hearing Exhibit 15. John J. Saunders, a certified plan reviewer, reviewed Ward's plans
and determined that the plans were "clear and can be easily understood to 'the proposed
placement, plans and design' per the warranty deed for plan approval." (July 13, 1995
Hearing Exhibit 15, p. 6). Brighton did not approve Ward's plans.
Thereafter, Ward submitted additional plans for approval to Brighton, namely, the
Classic Plan, the Cottage Plan, and the Chalet Plan. The Cottage Plan and Chalet Plan
were also submitted to and approved by Salt Lake County. See Certificate of Custodian
of Records (Exhibit D to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment)
(R. 921-22). The Chalet Plan was resubmitted to Salt Lake County in 1998 (the "Revised
Chalet Plan") and approved once again by Salt Lake County. Certified Letter of Public
Record (Exhibit E to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) (R.
921-22). Salt Lake County officials certified that Ward's plans met all applicable
requirements of the Wasatch Canyon Master Plan, Wasatch Canyon Development
Standards, the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ("FCOZ"), and all land use and
zoning requirements of Salt Lake County. Certified Letter of Public Record (attached as
Exhibit E to Ward's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) (R. 921-22).
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Kimble Shaw testified that he reviewed the Designer, Cottage, and Chalet Plans,
and "in my opinion find them to be clear and unambiguous." Affidavit of Kimble Shaw
at Tffl 5-6, 10 (attached as Exhibit J to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment) (R. 956-57). Shaw also testified that it is an "acceptable
architectural practice for a licensed architect to design a structure and have a draftsmen
draw the working drawings." Id. at ^f 11. Salt Lake County had determined that because
FCOZ was enacted after a site plan for Ward's property had been approved, the property
was not subject to FCOZ. See August 11, 19998 Certified Letter of Public Record from
William A. Marsh, Salt Lake County Development Services Division (R. 924).
Issue 4:

Whether the trial court erred in refusing at trial to consider the latest set of
plans submitted to Brighton by Ward

On October 22, 1999, the trial court granted Brighton's Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement and ordered that "the issue to be decided at trial on November 17,
and 18, 1999, is whether the plans submitted by Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999
complied with the criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated
letters." November 3, 1999 Order (R. 1417-18 at ^ 3). After the March 3, 1999
stipulation regarding the proposed settlement, Ward, through Kimble Shaw, submitted the
April 1999 Plans and the June 1999 Supplements to Brighton for review. (R. 1751:34849). Brighton rejected the plans. See June 23, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to
Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 13).
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After submitting the April 1999 Plans to Brighton, Ward received a memorandum
from Brighton's architect, Neil Richardson, making comments on the plans. Trial
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1750:349); Trial Exhibit No. 5. Shaw was in the process of
incorporating Richardson's comments into the April 1999 Plans when he was told to stop
because Ward believed that Brighton was not acting in good faith and this matter could
not be settled. Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:363-64). However, Shaw subsequently
made the revisions requested by Richardson, as well as changes aimed at meeting
Brighton's concerns expressed in its June 23, 1999 letter. These changes were included
in the plans dated August 23, 1999. Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:366); Trial Exhibit
No. 27). These plans were submitted to Brighton for review on October 6, 1999.5 See
Trial Exhibit No. 29; Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:473). 1751:473-74).
On October 11, 1999, Brighton informed Ward that it refused to review the plans
submitted on October 6, 1999, because it wanted to wait until the trial court decided its
pending Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and also because it would not review
any additional plans unless Ward paid the costs and expenses, including attorney's fees,
associated with Brighton's review of the plans submitted in April and June. See October
11, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 37) (requesting
payment of $5,446.50 in attorney's fees).

5

These plans were dated August 23, 1999, but submitted on October 6, 1999. Page
one of the plans is a Site Plan. The Site Plan was modified slightly on November 9, 1999,
and delivered to Brighton on November 11, 1999. These plans were introduced as Trial
Exhibit No. 27 and are referred to as the "October 1999 Plans."
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On October 26,1999, after the trial court granted Brighton's Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement, Brighton sent Ward a letter stating as follows:
. . . we believe that the plans that will be litigated at trial are those Mr. Ward
submitted on April 9, 1999 and resubmitted, with corrections, on or about
June 16, 1999. Due to the upcoming trial date, we need clarification of this
issue immediately. Please let us know before the end of the week if you are
going to contend that any other set of plans will be litigated at trial.
October 26, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 30).
On November 1, 1999, Ward's counsel informed Brighton that the latest set of
plans submitted to Brighton on October 6, 1999 would be litigated at
With regard to Scott's October 26, 1999 letter requesting clarification of
which plans will be litigated at trial, it seems clear that the plans will be the
latest plans submitted to you. Mr. Ward submitted plans to Brighton
Corporation in accordance with the terms of the proposed settlement
agreement. Mr. Ward made revisions to those plans in response to your
objections and concerns. These revisions are contained in the plans that we
delivered to you on October 6, 1999. If you eventually decide to review
those plans and notify us of any items that you believe are still deficient,
Mr. Ward reserves the right to try to correct these deficiencies prior to trial.
November 1, 1999 letter from James K. Tracy to James S. Jardine (Trial Exhibit No. 39).
Brighton continued to refuse to review the latest set of plans. At trial, Brighton
argued that the only issue for trial should be whether the plans submitted in June 1999
complied with the settlement agreement that was ruled to exist by the trial court. Trial
Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:14-16). The Court ruled that it would not consider the
October 1999 Plans because Brighton had not reviewed them. Id. at 1750:32-50;
February 3, 2000 Order (R. 1690-91) (ruling that "Brighton correctly determined that the
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plans submitted in October 1999 were not properly presented for review and did not
review them. Accordingly, those plans were not considered during the trial.").
Shaw stated that he did not regard the April, June, or October plans as "final
plans." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:419). However, Shaw's statement that these
were not "final" plans must be considered in tandem with his testimony that all of the
information requested by Brighton was on the plans (R. 1751:350, lines 8-14). The plans
were not "final" only in the sense that Shaw indicated that he was willing to work with
Brighton on any changes that they might request. (R. 1751:344). Ward clarified this
issue when he testified that "if Brighton Corporation would approved those plans, then
they'd be final plans." (R. 1751:501). However, because Brighton did not approve the
plans, Ward continued to make changes which were included in the October Plans. (R.
1751:501-02). Ward submitted the October Plans "hoping to get a final review and
approval from Brighton . . . in hope to settle and finally resolve this matter." (R.
1751:474).
Brighton refused to review the October 1999 Plans because Ward had not paid
Brighton's attorney's fees for prior review of plans. See Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R.
1751:285) (Court understood that Brighton refused to review October 1999 Plans because
Ward had not paid for Brighton's prior review of the other plans. Mr. Jardine confirmed
that "that's our position your Honor."). The trial court apparently agreed with this
position, stating that Brighton "should not be required to incur more of those costs before
some reimbursement is made back to them." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:290).
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Issue 5:

Whether the trial court erred in ruling at the trial of this matter that Brighton
properly rejected Ward's plans

At trial, Brighton claimed that it rejected Ward's plans because of deficiencies
listed on Trial Exhibit No. 14. See Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:74) (referring to
Exhibit 14, Mary Barton testified that "Yes. That's what we decided that it did not
comply with."). The evidence regarding the specific points claimed by Brighton to be
deficient, along with the evidence presented by Ward that the plans were sufficient, is set
forth below:6
1.

The drawings of the north main entrance. See Trial Exhibit No. 14,fflf1, 7.
a.

Brighton's evidence. The October 28, 1998 and February 22, 1999 letters

state that prior plans of the north main entrance to the cabin were not sufficiently detailed,
requested contour lines and exact elevations, and "suggested" that the entrance be located
on the east side or the west side of the cabin. Trial Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. Mary Barton
testified that the June 1999 Supplements submitted by Ward were not sufficiently detailed
and that Brighton "didn't get a plan showing the front porch. (R. 1750:80). She further
indicated that a dotted line that showed existing grade and a heavy black line showing the
grade after construction of the porch were insufficient. (R. 1750:81; 100-01). Mary
Barton wanted exterior elevation drawings that showed "how the cabin was built into the
slope of the mountain." (R. 1750:101).
6

The items in Exhibit 14 are not restrictions found in the Special Warranty Deed.
Consequently, if there is no settlement agreement between the parties, none of these
requirements would have been at issue at the trial.
25

Mary Barton was concerned that the plans showed a retaining wall on the northeast
side of the cabin, but there was "no retaining wall or no grading or anything shown to the
north side." (R. 1750:82). However, she could tell that Ward intended to make a "deep
cut" and that was the basis on which she concluded the plans were insufficient regarding
the north porch. (R. 1750:83). Mary Barton relied on her architect, Neil Richardson, to
determine the adequacy of the plans. (R. 1750:142).
Richardson did not testify that the "heavy black line" was insufficient. Richardson
testified that the retaining wall to the east of the porch was too close to the limit of
disturbance line and that there were no dimensions called out on the wall. (R. 1750:16869). He also believed that there was not sufficient detail to determine what grading would
be done over the waterline. (R. 1750:172-73)
b.

Ward's evidence.7 Kimble Shaw, Ward's architect, testified that the north

porch was shown on three detailed drawings. First, the site plan (Trial Exhibit No. 17)
showed "existing grades, grades that are being moved, and the existing grade before
construction. This included a drawing which showed the "retaining wall that hold backs
the earth." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:357). Second, the floor plan (Trial Exhibit
No. 18) showed a "quarter-inch scale plan of the front entry." (R. 1751:357). Finally, the
elevation drawings (Trial Exhibit No. 20) give an elevation view of the front entry porch
and "call out" the retaining wall. (R. 1751:357). The June 1999 Supplements also
7

During trial, Brighton stipulated that Mr. Ward believed that he had complied
with every requirement raised by Brighton at trial. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R.
1751:482).
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showed detailed information regarding the north porch. See Trial Exhibits No. 10 ("Site
Sections"), No. 11 ("Floor Plans"), and No. 7 ("Elevations").8
2.

Ward's plans referred to easements as "new" and "proposed." Trial Exhibit No.
14,12.
a.

Brighton's evidence. Ward had agreed that if the parties settled this

matter, he would "agree that there is an 18-foot easement for the wateriine." Transcript
of March 3, 1999 hearing at 10, lines 23-25 (Trial Exhibit No. 1). The October 28, 1999
letter stated that "[t]he existence and present location of Brighton Corporation's wateriine
and easement must be confirmed so there is no future dispute about it." October 28, 1999
letter (Trial Exhibit No. 2). Ward's plans showed the 18-foot easement, but described it
as a "new"and "proposed" easement. The words "new" and "proposed" on the plans
"troubled" Mary Barton. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:85, 147).
b.

Ward's evidence. The plans show the easement that would be

acknowledged by Ward once the parties settled this case. See Site Plans (Trial Exhibits
Nos. 6, 17, and 27). In addition, Mary Barton admitted on cross-examination that the
wateriine had previously been on top of the ground and had been buried and extended by
Brighton from its original position. (Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:142-43).9
8

As is discussed more fully below, Carl Eriksson was going to testify that Ward's
drawings were "as clear and detailed as any plans he has seen." Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Reconsider Disallowance of Testimony of Carl Eriksson (R. 1537 at ^| 5).
Mr. Eriksson was also going to testify that the grading was adequately shown on the
plans. Id. Judge Young refused to allow Carl Eriksson to testify on behalf of Ward.
9

The Special Warranty Deed only allowed Brighton a "permanent wateriine
(continued...)
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3.

Location of Ward's sewer line. Trial Exhibit No. 14, f 3.
The October 28, 1998 letter requests that Ward run his sewer line "along the west

end of his property." Trial Exhibit No. 2 at p.3. On the April 1999 Plans and the June
1999 Supplements, Ward showed the sewer line running through the middle of the
property where there was an existing road. See Trial Exhibit Nos. 6, 17. This was where
the Solitude Improvement District contemplated that the sewer would run. See
Testimony of William G. Lapsley, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751: 326-27). Mary
Barton testified that this was a ground for rejecting the plans. (R. 1750:89). After the
trial court ruled that the language in the October 28, 1998 letter was a binding settlement
agreement, Ward revised the plans to show the sewer line running on the west side of the
property. See Trial Exhibit No. 27; Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:479-80).
4.

South side patio's compliance with the Foothills Canyons Overlay Zone. Trial
Exhibit No. 14, 1f 4.
a.

Brighton's evidence. The February 22, 1999 letter states that a retaining

wall of more than six feet would violate the standards set out in the Foothills Canyons
Overlay Zone ("FCOZ"). Trial Exhibit No. 3 at ^ 3. Brighton "suggested" that Ward
reduce the size of the patio or step down the patio in compliance with FCOZ. IdL FCOZ
provides that a retaining wall used to support steep slopes "shall not exceed six feet in
height from the finished grade," except where the wall is terraced between two tiers of not

9

(...continued)
easement as the same now exists," i.e., existed on July 3, 1991. The updated survey
showed that not only was the waterline lowered and extended, it was also moved north.
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more than four foot tiers. Trial Exhibit No. 15 (pertinent portions of FCOZ are attached
to the Addendum as Exhibit N). Mary Barton testified that she believed the plans
submitted by Ward contained a retaining wall on the southeast side of the cabin that was
in excess of six feet high. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:95-97). Her architect, Neil
Richardson, testified that he was generally familiar with FCOZ (R. 1750:155), and that
even with the proposed tiered system, the "corners of that wall exceed that step [i.e.,
allowable under the FCOZ requirements]." (R. 1750:164-65).
b.

Ward's evidence. By tiering the retaining wall with a planter box, the

corners of the retaining wall were less than six feet and did not violate FCOZ. See, e.g..
Trial Exhibit No. 7. The step design of the retaining wall left a retaining wall height of
about five and one-half feet at the end of the step. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:514-15). Architect Kimble Shaw also testified that by
terracing the retaining wall with a "triangulated planner," the retaining wall satisfied
FCOZ. Trial Transcript., Vol. II (R. 1751:378). Salt Lake County had approved the plan
design as complying with all county requirements, including FCOZ. See Testimony of
Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:515).10
5.

Updated survey and transparency of survey. Trial Exhibit No. 14, ^ 8.
a.

Brighton's evidence. The October 28, 1998 letter requested that Ward

include with his plans a copy of the original Francom survey and include a transparent
copy of the Sneidman survey. Trial Exhibit No. 2, at p.5. On March 3, 1999, James S.
10

Carl Eriksson was also going to testify that the plans complied with FCOZ.
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Jardine indicated that Ward would provide an updated survey addressing "in detail what
are called 'areas of disturbance.'" March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:5). Mary Barton
testified that she never received a transparency of the Sneidman survey. Trial Transcript,
Vol. 1 (R. 1750:104). Richardson believed that the drawings did not accurately show
existing conditions. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:160). He noted that there were trees
shown in the road that goes through the property. (R. 1750:161). In addition, a circular
driveway was not shown on the survey. (R. 1750:162). Richardson asked that all trees
with a three inch or greater diameter be shown on the survey. Trial Exhibit No. 5.
b.

Ward's evidence. Greg Ward testified that because of heavy snows in

Brighton canyon, a surveyor was not able to conduct an updated survey until "mid-June"
1999. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:467). The
survey was updated on June 19, 1999, and again on October 6, 1999, and submitted to
Brighton. See Trial Exhibit No. 46. Ward also testified that he already given Brighton a
copy of the requested transparency and that Brighton had never asked for another copy.
Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:486-88).
6.

Correction of "support documents". Trial Exhibit No. 14, ^[ 11.
a.

Brighton's evidence. Mary Barton saw copies of "support documents" that

had been filed by Mr. Ward with Salt Lake County with a prior application for a building
permit. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:105). The October 28, 1998 letter states that
Brighton wanted Ward to correct those support documents, and submit a copy to Brighton
for approval. Trial Exhibit No. 2 at p.6. The letter does not state what was to be
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corrected on the "support documents." Id. Barton testified at trial that she never received
a corrected copy of the documents. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:105).
b.

Ward's evidence. Ward testified that when his plans were approved by

Brighton, he intended to withdraw all "support documents" from the county and that he
would not submit support documents with his building permit application in the future.
Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R: 1751:533-34).
7.

Submission of color board. Trial Exhibit No. 14, ^| 12.
a.

Brighton's evidence. The October 28, 1998 letter requested a "color board

for exterior finish." Trial Exhibit No. 2 at 6. Mary Barton testified that she did not
receive a copy of this color board with the June 1999 Supplements. Trial Transcript, Vol.
I (R. 1750:106). She later testified that she had received color boards, but thought that
she received several different color boards. (R. 1750:131-32).
b.

Ward's evidence. Mary Barton admitted that she may have received the

color board with a prior set of plans. (R. 1750:126-27). Ward testified that he had
previously given Brighton the color chart admitted as Trial Exhibit 16 and a color board
admitted as Trial Exhibit 56, and that Brighton had not indicated in its response to the
April 1999 Plans or the June 1999 Supplements that another color board was required.
Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:446-47, 489-90).
8.

Withdrawal of all prior plans from the county. Trial Exhibit No. 14, f 15.
It was undisputed that Ward had not yet withdrawn any prior plans from Salt Lake

County. Ward testified that he intended to withdraw such prior plans after Brighton had
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approved his plans. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R.
1751:533). Mary Barton agreed, testifying that Mr. Ward would withdraw his prior plans
at the time he filed approved plans. Testimony of Mary Barton, Trial Transcript, Vol. I
(R. 1750:117) (Q. "Just that the settlement agreement was that whatever plans were on
file with the county that Mr. Ward had filed, he would withdraw at the time he file the
Brighton approved plans?" A. "Yes.").
Issue 6:

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Ward's expert witness.
Carl Eriksson, who was also a fact witness, to testify at trial

Ward attempted to call Carl Eriksson to testify at the trial of this matter, both as an
expert witness and a fact witness. There was no dispute as to Mr. Eriksson's
qualifications as an expert. See Carl Eriksson Resume (Trial Exhibit No. 31). He had
approximately 26 years of experience in engineering and reviewing building plans for
compliance with building codes and zoning ordinances. (R. 1750:221). He had been
employed by Salt Lake County for approximately 16 years, where he was responsible for
plan review, including engineering and zoning issues. (R. 1750:219-20).
Neil Richardson, who testified as to whether Ward's plans complied with FCOZ,
stated that he was "generally familiar" with the zoning ordinance. Testimony of Neil
Richardson, Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750: 155). On the other hand, Carl Eriksson
testified that he was intimately familiar with FCOZ, and in fact, assisted in drafting those
requirements and had been responsible to direct the implementation of their requirements
since their inception. Testimony of Carl Eriksson, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751: 221-
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22). He had, in his career, personally inspected approximately 100 building plans for
compliance with FCOZ. (R. 1751:223).
Brighton's counsel conducted voir-dire of Mr. Eriksson, who testified that he had
only reviewed "small parts" of the Transcript of the March 3, 1999 hearing, the October
28, 1999 letter, the February 22, 1999 letter, and the checklists (Trial Exhibit Nos. 1-4).
(R. 1750:223-34). Based on that fact, the trial court excluded Mr. Eriksson from
testifying at the trial.
In a motion to reconsider argued during the trial, Ward proffered that the
anticipated testimony of Carl Eriksson would include the following: (1) Ward's plans
submitted in April 1999 and October 1999 contained all the required components of a
building plan; (2) Salt Lake County had already approved the design set forth in the April
1999 and October 1999 building plans as complying with FCOZ; (3) it is impossible for
the cabin in this case to be built at a main floor elevation of 116.83 feet and at the same
time have the cabin "on-grade" on the west side. Building the cabin at a main floor
elevation of 116.83 feet results in the cabin being below grade on the west side, which is
not preferred; (4) the plaintiffs contention in paragraph 1 of Exhibit 14 that Mr. Ward has
not provided detailed drawings of north main entrance is without merit. The drawings
were as clear and detailed as any plans he had ever seen. The elevation drawings clearly
show the existing grade and clearly show how the cabin relates to that existing grade; (5)
Ward's grading/draining plan is more detailed than most plans submitted to the County;
(6) the plaintiffs contention that the grading might effect their waterline was without
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merit; (7) the patio on the south side of the cabin complies with FCOZ; and (8) the plans
submitted by Mr. Ward in April 1999 and June 1999 are sufficiently detailed that the
cabin could be build without any information other than what was included on the plans.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Disallowance of Testimony of Carl
Eriksson (R. 1537-44). See also Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 232-271) (oral argument on
motion to reconsider).
Issue 7:

Whether the trial court erred in denying Ward's application for
determination that consent to build the cabin had been unreasonably
withheld after the July 13, 1995 evidentiary hearing

In October 1994 the trial court entered a preliminary injunction against Ward
enjoining Ward from constructing a cabin on his property without the express approval of
Brighton, but stated that ff[i]n the event that defendants submit new and different
proposed plans to plaintiff, which plans are then disapproved, defendants may apply to
this Court for a determination of whether approval has been unreasonably withheld."
October 4, 1994 Order at If 20 (R. 315).
As stated above, Ward subsequently submitted revised plans to Brighton for
approval. Brighton refused to approve the plans and the trial court held a hearing on July
13, 1995 to determine whether Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the plans.
The evidence presented by Ward and Brighton at that hearing is set forth below.
a.

Brighton's evidence. The proposed design contained a second floor

ceiling which could be converted to a loft. Affidavit of Neil W. Richardson at ^ 9(b)
(July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 16) (hereinafter "Richardson Aff."). The plans called for
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a roof pitch of 8/12. According to Neil Richardson, the preferred Alpine design in Utah is
to retain snow on the roof with a 3/12 pitch.1! Richardson Aff. at f 9(a).
Neil Richardson stated that the elevations shown on the proposed plans and the
model were different than a topographical map previously provided to him and the
renderings were ambiguous in that either the main floor would be three to four feet or
more above 8812f, and therefore significantly above grade on the west, or else the
entrance on the north and windows on the east would be below grade, contrary to the
renderings. Richardson Aff. at f 9(c). Finally, Richardson did not believe that the plans
met the Wasatch Canyons Development Standards (the "Standards") because the design
called for the main floor of the cabin to be above-grade and required excessive cuts that
conflicted with the Standard's objectives. Richardson Aff. at ^ 10(b).
b.

Ward's evidence. Ward reviewed the trial court's October 4, 1994 order

and made changes to his proposed plans in order to conform with that order. Testimony
of Gregory M. Ward, Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing (R. 1753:20). Ward put the
cabin on grade on the west side. (R. 1753:21). In addition, Ward completely eliminated
the basement by putting the main floor on slab concrete. (R. 1753:21). The loft was also

ll

It should be noted that at trial, Neil Richardson contradicted his own testimony at
the July 13, 1995, hearing by testifying that there is not a preferred alpine pitch design.
Testimony of Neil Richardson, Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R: 1750:187) (testifying that there
are two acceptable theories, one to hold snow on the roof and the other to allow it to slide
off). Further, as Ward's counsel made clear at the hearing, Brighton raised the issue
regarding the pitch of the roof for the first time at the hearing, having never before
discussed this issue with Ward or his counsel. July 13, 1995 Transcript (R. 1753:75).
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completely eliminated. (R. 1753:21). The attic was now designed so that it was
incapable of holding live loads. (R. 1753:21).
Ward changed the roof pitch of his cabin from 9/12 to 8/12. (R. 1753:21-22). The
first floor on the proposed cabin was built back into the hill very similar to Mary Barton's
cabin. (R. 1753:22-23). The plans were redrawn to ensure that each floor was below
1,200 square feet. (R. 1753:23).
The overall height of the cabin was reduced by around 10 or 11 feet from the
original plans rejected in 1994. (R. 1753:24). The top of Ward's proposed cabin was
three feet below the building grade of Mary Barton's cabin, and the proposed cabin was
100 to 120 feet from Mary Barton's cabin. (R. 1753:26). From the east side-the side
facing Mary Barton's cabin-the proposed cabin gave the appearance of being only one
story and pushed into the hill. (R. 1753:40-41).
William A. Marsh III, a Manager of Salt Lake County's Development Services
Division, testified that "[t]he plans submitted by Gregory Ward, which have been
approved, conform with the Wasatch Canyon Development's Standards as applied by the
county in connection with this type of residential development." Affidavit of William A.
Marsh III at ^ 7 (R. 457). See also July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 15, p.3 (the plans met
all county zoning requirements and were approved by Salt Lake County Planning and
Zoning).

Finally, John J. Saunders, a certified plan reviewer, stated that the plans were

clear in their presentation and can be easily understood for an approval process regarding
"the proposed placement, plans and design." (July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 15, p.6).
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Issue 8:

Whether the trial court erred in not recusing Judge David S. Young for bias
and prejudice and whether the Supreme Court should order that Judge
David S. Young be recused from this action for bias and for denying Ward
his due process rights throughout the proceedings below

In 1996, while this case was pending, Judge David S. Young was engaged in a
hotly contested retention election. Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward in Support of Motion
Requesting Recusal and Reassignment at f 1(R. 659). Judge Young succeeded in his
retention election by a very narrow margin, reported to be just "barely 50 percent" of the
vote. Id at Tf 2 (R. 660). During the course of the retention election campaign, large
display ads were published in local newspapers publicly soliciting votes in favor of Judge
Young's retention. These ads were run on several dates in October and November 1996.
Id. at ^ 3 (R. 660); see also Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward in Support of
Motion Requesting Recusal and Reassignment (R. 671).
The ad in the newspaper listed individuals who proclaimed their public support for
Judge Young. Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward in Support of Motion Requesting Recusal
and Reassignment, at f 4 (R. 660). The list of individuals included James S. Jardine, lead
counsel for plaintiff, and approximately 25 attorneys from the law firm of Ray, Quinney
& Nebeker, which represented plaintiff in this action. Id at TJ 6 (R. 660).
As a defendant before Judge Young, Ward had a reasonable concern about Judge
Young's ability to be completely impartial, knowing that plaintiff was represented by
James S. Jardine and Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, who played such a high profile and
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publicly advertised role in Judge Young!s closely contested retention election campaign
while this case was pending. Id, at ^f 7 (R. 660).
On May 16, 1997, before any hearings had been held in the case since the retention
election, Ward filed a Motion Requesting Recusal and Reassignment. (R. 651-53). Judge
Young refused to recuse himself and the matter was referred to Judge Leslie A. Lewis in
accordance with Rule 63(b), who denied the motion. June 9, 1997 Court's Ruling (R.
719).
From very early in these proceedings, and especially after Ward sought Judge
Young's recusal, Judge Young has exhibited unfairness, amounting to actual bias, in favor
of Mary Barton and Brighton Corporation. For example, at the hearing on July 13, 1995,
the court allowed opposing counsel to offer an uninterrupted opening statement.
Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing (R. 1753:5-10). When counsel for Ward gave an
opening statement, the court interrupted several times, challenging the proposed plans
before any evidence regarding the plans had been presented. (R. 1753:11, 12, 13-14).
Before Ward's counsel had even finished his opening statement, and before any evidence
had been heard regarding all the changes that had been made to the plans, the court stated:
"it strikes me that it isn't a good faith effort to try to redesign a cabin if you only make a 9
foot difference." (R. 1753:12). Ward's counsel responded to each one of the court's
challenging statements and the court finally stated: "Well, go ahead and present your
evidence and I'll sit and hear it." (R. 1753:16).
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Despite the fact that the very purpose of the July 13,1995 hearing was to
determine whether Brighton was unreasonably withholding approval of Wardfs plans, the
court stated at the end of the hearing that "[it] didn't know whether [plaintiff] was being
picky about the kinds of things that [plaintiff was] expecting [Ward] to do in [his] cabin
or to build in [his] cabin." (R. 1753:71). Nevertheless, the court proceeded to rule that
Ward's plans did not adequately comply with the requirements of the Special Warranty
Deed, but failed to state how the plans failed to comply. (R. 1753:76).
Ward submitted a number of revised plans as set forth above, always complying
with the "two floors" and "1,200 square feet" requirements. Nevertheless, Brighton
Corporation refused to approve the plans. In order to attempt to salvage the 1996
building season, Ward requested an expedited hearing an another motion for a
determination by the court whether Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval. (R.
468-70). The court refused to hear Ward's motion. June 5, 1996 Minute Entry (R. 611).
On December 22, 1998, James Jardine, on behalf of plaintiff, filed the summary
judgment discussed above. On December 23, 1998, the court held a scheduling
conference. At that time, Ward's counsel had not had an opportunity to even review the
summary judgment motion. Affidavit of Douglas J. Parry ^f 3 (Exhibit H to Gregory M.
Ward's Petition for Emergency Extraordinary Writ). At the conclusion of the scheduling
conference, Brighton's counsel informed Judge Young of the summary judgment motion.
Judge Young stated that he was inclined to grant the motion before he had an opportunity
to review the motion and before Ward had an opportunity to respond to the motion. IdL
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Ward's counsel objected on the ground that Ward had not had an opportunity to respond,
and Judge Young said that Ward could go ahead and file an opposition, but the court was
nevertheless inclined to grant the motion, which it did. Parry Aff. at ^ 4.
As set forth above in detail in the Statement of Facts relating to Issue No. 2
(relating to the pavement of the road), on September 8, 1999, Judge Young ruled that
Brighton could pave the roadway over Ward's Property without giving Ward any notice
or a fair opportunity to be heard. Parry Aff. at ^flf 10, 12.
Judge Young's biased rulings continued at trial. As detailed above, Judge Young
refused to consider the October 1999 Plans because Brighton had not reviewed them,
even though his own ruling, issued October 22, 1999, stated that the issue for trial would
be whether the plans submitted by Ward after March 3, 1999 complied with the
settlement agreement. Judge Young allowed Brighton' witness, Neil Richardson, who
stated that he was "generally familiar" with the zoning ordinance, to testify at trial
regarding whether Ward's plans complied with FCOZ, but would not allow Ward's
expert, Carl Eriksson, to rebut this testimony, even though Eriksson was more familiar
with the statute and its application than Neil Richardson.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Brighton has unreasonably refused to approve Ward's plans to build a cabin on his
Property for the last six years, despite the fact that Ward's plans have met the
requirements in the Special Warranty Deed that the cabin have only two floors of no more
than 1,200 square feet per floor . The trial court has facilitated and upheld Brighton's
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refusal to approve plans even though Ward has complied with the restrictive covenants
and submitted plans that any reasonable person would approve (and which in fact were
approved by Salt Lake County).
The threshold issue in this case is whether the parties entered into a binding
settlement agreement on March 3, 1999. This issue will determine what standard should
be applied in reviewing Ward's plans. The record clearly establishes that the parties
informed the trial court of a proposed settlement, but that the settlement never was
accomplished. The proposal contemplated that Ward would resubmit plans which
addressed issues raised by Brighton in an October 28, 1998 letter and a February 22, 1999
letter. The parties agreed that any settlement must include "approved plans." Therefore,
there could not be any settlement without plan approval and it is undisputed that Brighton
never approved any plans. The March 3, 1999 transcript is replete with references to the
proposed nature of the settlement. The fact that the trial court gave the parties a trial date
at the end of April 1999 is further evidence that the case was not settled, but rather, that
the parties were working towards a settlement. The trial court erred in ruling that the
parties had entered into an enforceable contract and settlement agreement, the terms of
which were not specifically identified, but were ruled to be contained in the October 1998
letter, the February 22, 1999 letter, the March 3, 1999 transcript, and two checklists.
Such an agreement lacks sufficient definiteness to be enforced. In addition, the conduct
of the parties after March 3, 1999, establishes that the parties did not reach a meeting of
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the minds on key issues, including, but not limited to, the payment of attorney's fees and
final approval of the plans.
The trial court erred in ruling on a summary judgment motion that (1) that Greg
Ward must compensate Brighton for all costs, including attorney's fees, associated with
any future review by Brighton of any new plans submitted by Ward; (2) that it was
reasonable for Brighton to require a licensed architect to sign any plans for the cabin; and
(3) that it was reasonable for Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone
("FCOZ") ordinance of Salt Lake County in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. There
were no such requirements in the operative Special Warranty Deed. In addition, the basis
for Brighton's motion for summary judgment was Brighton's allegation that it was
burdened by Ward's repeated submission of ambiguous plans. Ward controverted the
assertion that the plans were ambiguous and therefore, the issue was not properly decided
on summary judgment. The requirement to pay attorney's fees also violated the wellaccepted rule that attorney's fees can be awarded only by statute or by contract.
Further, even if Brighton were entitled to attorney's fees based on the trial court's
erroneous summary judgment order, if the parties actually entered into a settlement
agreement as ruled by the trial court, Brighton compromised any right to attorney's fees
as a part of that settlement.
As a part of Brighton's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, Brighton
requested that the trial court allow it to pave a roadway across Ward's property. The
Property Use Agreement prohibited the paving of the road. The trial court violated
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Ward's due process rights by granting this motion before Ward's counsel had received
the motion or had a fair opportunity to oppose the motion.
After March 3, 1999, Ward submitted plans to Brighton on April 9, 1999, June 16,
1999, and October 6, 1999. The October 6, 1999 plans incorporated specific changes
requested by Brighton after it reviewed the April and June plans. Brighton wrongfully
refused to review the October 6, 1999 plans, demanding payment of its attorney's fees for
reviewing the April and June plans before it would review additional plans. On October
22, 1999, the trial court held that a settlement existed and that the issue at trial would be
whether the plans submitted by Ward to Brighton after March 3, 1999 complied with the
settlement. Thereafter, Brighton continued to refuse to review the October 6, 1999 plans.
The trial court ruled that Ward could not submit evidence of the October 6, 1999
plans at trial because Brighton had not reviewed the plans. Consequently, the entire trial
on November 17-19, 1999, was on the issue of whether the earlier plans were sufficient,
even though both parties acknowledged that the October 6, 1999 plans were the latest
plans. The trial court violated its own order by refusing to consider the latest set of plans
submitted by Ward to Brighton.
Additionally, the trial court erred in not allowing Ward's expert, Carl Eriksson, to
testify that Ward's plans were clear, unambiguous, detailed, and complied with every
requirement raised by Brighton at trial. The trial court also erred in ruling that Ward's
plans were properly rejected by Brighton. Brighton raised eight objections to Ward's
plans, each of which was adequately rebutted by Ward.
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In 1995 Ward had submitted plans to Brighton which only had two floors and less
than 1,200 square feet per floor. Brighton wrongfully rejected those plans. The court
erred in not ruling that Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the 1995 plans.
Finally, the trial court erred in refusing to recuse Judge Young after James Jardine
played a prominent and advertised role in Judge Young's 1996 retention election
campaign. Judge Young has consistently prejudged this case and demonstrated actual
bias against Ward, all in violation of Ward's due process rights to fair and unbiased
hearings. The Supreme Court should order that Judge Young be recused from this case
and that this case be reassigned to another district court judge.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
Ward's ability to build on his Property is governed by the restrictive covenants in
the Special Warranty Deed, which require that Ward's cabin be limited to two floors with
no more than 1,200 square feet per floor, and provide that Brighton has the right to review
and approve Ward's plans, which approval "shall be timely and shall not be unreasonably
withheld." Special Warranty Deed (Trial Exhibit No. 44).
This Court has explained that "restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and
are strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property." St. Benedict's
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194. 198 (Utah 1991) "Generally,
express restrictive covenants are upheld only 'where they are necessary for the protection
of the business for the benefit of which the covenant was made and no greater restraint is
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imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection.'" Id. (quoting Allen v.
Rose Park Pharmacy. 237 P.2d 823, 826 (1951)). It is axiomatic that where a restrictive
covenant gives the grantor the right to restrict the free use of property by approving or
disapproving construction plans, that right must be exercised reasonably and in good
faith. See, e ^ , Norris v. Phillips. 626 P.2d 717, 719 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); McNamee v.
Bishop Trust Co.. 616 P.2d 205, 208 (Hawaii 1980). These limitations are intended to
prevent the exercise of subjective, and unfettered discretion in disapproving plans. In this
case, since 1995 the trial court has refused to constrain Brighton's discretion to that of an
objectively reasonably person, and instead allowed Brighton to assert any subjective
ground for disapproving Ward's plans, regardless of whether those grounds were
supported by the evidence or were reasonable.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE CONDITIONAL
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTED A BINDING AND ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
"Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract
actions." Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). A "trial court has the
power to enter a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement if it is an enforceable
contract." Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). The proposed conditional settlement agreement in this case is not an
enforceable contract for the following three reasons: (1) the proposed agreement
constituted preliminary negotiations to which further manifestations of assent were
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required; (2) there were never any plans approved, which was an essential condition of
any settlement; and (3) the proposed agreement lacked sufficient definiteness to be
enforced and the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on essential terms of the
proposed agreement.
1.

The proposed agreement constituted preliminary negotiations to which
further manifestations of assent were required.
Preliminary negotiations do not constitute a binding contract. Sadder, 897 P.2d at

1221. This Court has explained, with regard to preliminary negotiations, as follows:
A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the
person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person
making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further
manifestation of assent.
Sadder, 897 P.2d at 1221 (quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 26 (1981)).
In this case, both parties made it clear that a settlement was conditioned on a
"further manifestation of assent." Ward would further manifest his assent by submitting
new plans to Brighton. Brighton would further manifest its assent to settlement by
approving those plans. Brighton never approved the plans, i.e., never manifested its
assent to the settlement. Consequently, no enforceable agreement was reached.
Although the parties exchanged correspondence regarding a proposed settlement
for a number of months, it is clear that as of March 2, 1999, the parties had not reached
any agreement. On that day, counsel for Brighton wrote to counsel for Ward, stating as
follows: "In an effort to see if this matter can be settled prior to trial, I am writing to
clarify our understanding of our discussions on a proposed settlement." March 2, 1999
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letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit E
to Brighton's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement) (R.
1256-58). See also Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement (R. 1400) ("Brighton agrees that the proposal stated in the March 2, 1999
letter was only a proposal, i.e., it was not accepted on that day.").
Nor had any final settlement agreement been reached on March 3, 1999, when the
parties informed the Court of their settlement discussions. As set forth above in the
Statement of Facts, it is abundantly evident from the record in this case that the proposed
settlement was a conditional settlement. As explained by Brighton's counsel at the outset
of the March 3, 1999 hearing, "It, in fact, Your Honor, is a conditional settlement wefd
like to read into the record. It's conditional because certain actions remain to be taken."
March 3, 1999 Transcript at 3, lines 17-19 (R. 1745:3). Thereafter, as set forth in the
Statement of Facts above, Brighton's counsel makes at least seven more references to the
conditional nature of the proposal.
The fact that the parties asked for, and were granted, a trial date immediately after
reading into the record the proposed agreement is compelling evidence that no final and
binding settlement had yet been reached. If a settlement had been agreed upon, there
would be no need for a trial date. In that event, the Court would have vacated the trial
date rather than continue the trial date. See, e.g., Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending
Systems. Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (cancellation of a trial setting was
"an act consistent with a settlement having been reached."); Zions First National Bank v.
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Barbara Jensen Interiors. Inc., 781 P.2d 478,479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("The court also
noted that, consistent with a settlement having been reached, the Jensen's depositions
were cancelled and the trial date stricken by Zion.").
The parties did nothing more than present to the trial court what the proposal was
for resolving this matter. The record is clear that the proposal was conditional and that
further manifestations of assent were required from both Ward, through the submittal of
revised plans, and from Brighton, through the approval of those plans.
2.

There were never any plans approved, which was an essential condition of the
proposed settlement.
There could not be any settlement until Brighton approved Ward's plans. The

October 28, 1998 letter, which the trial court held to be a part of the settlement,
specifically provided that "any settlement must be fully and completely documented and
incorporated in an order of the Court that includes all approved plans . . . . " October 28,
1998 letter at 2 (Trial Exhibit No. 2) (emphasis added). On March 2, 1999, Brighton
confirmed that an essential term of the proposed settlement was that "final plans, if
approved, be included and incorporated into the Court's final order." See March 2, 1999
letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (R. 1258). Likewise, on March 3, 1999,
James S. Jardine told the trial court that "if all of this is achieved and accomplished and
finally resolved . . . that a final order would be entered with the Court, setting forth all of
the terms of the settlement [and] attaching the plans . . .." March 3, 1999 Transcript at 13
(R. 1745:13).
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The parties contemplated that there would not be a settlement unless and until
Brighton approved Ward's plans. It was undisputed that Brighton never approved Ward's
plans, and therefore, there was no settlement between the parties.
3.

The proposed agreement was ambiguous and lacked sufficient defmiteness to
be enforced and the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on essential
terms of the agreement
It is well-accepted that "a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the

obligations of the parties are 'set forth with sufficient defmiteness that it can be
performed." Plateau Mining Co. v. The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802
P.2d 720, 726 (Utah 1990). See also Oberhanslv v. Earle. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah
1977) ("It is a basic principle of contract law there can be no contract without a meeting
of the minds of the parties which must be spelled out either expressly or impliedly with
sufficient defmiteness to allow enforcement."); Sadder, 897 P.2d at 1220 ("Under the
principles of basic contract law, a contract is not formed unless there is a meeting of the
minds." ).
In determining whether a contract has been reached between two parties, the court
may examine a number of factors, including "the extent to which express agreement has
been reached on all the terms to be included," and "whether it has few or many details."
Sadder, 897 P.2d at 1221. This case involves "many details" which were never reduced
to a writing and upon which Brighton and Ward did not reach a meeting of the minds.
In this case, the trial court held that the terms of the settlement agreement were
contained in the seven page October 28, 1998 letter, the three page February 22, 1999
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letter, and the twenty-five page March 3, 1999 transcript. The two letters could contain as
man\ as fifty to seventy separate requirements depending on how the letters are
interpreted. The letters contain language such as Brighton "suggests" Ward do certain
things or Ward "should" do certain things, making it unclear whether these suggestions
are terms of a settlement. In fact, on March 2, 1999, Brighton informed Ward that "the
February 22, 1999 letter does not set out terms of settlement but does list three areas of
deficiency." March 2, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (R. 1400).
The letters include extremely broad and ambiguous language such as requests for
more "detailed drawings" and statements that the plans are "incomplete" or do not
"adequately clarify" certain items. Judge Young himself recognized that the agreement
was not very specific, stating that "I was uncomfortable with the specificity of it." Trial
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 240) (Nevertheless, he concluded that it was "sufficiently specific
that there could be a common understanding."). Id.
The fact that the parties have disagreed on the exact terms of the settlement is
evidence that the agreement was too vague and ambiguous to be enforced. Did the
"settlement" require Ward to simply comply with FCOZ (by using a tiered retaining wall
system for example), or was he required to use a stepped patio? Did the "settlement"
simply require Ward to provide "more" detail on the front porch, or was he actually
prohibited from using a "heavy black line" to show grading? Did the settlement require
Ward to produce a detailed survey of the entire Property, or just the areas of disturbance?
Did the "settlement" require the cabin to be "on grade on the west," or sited at a main
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level of 116.83 feet or both? (Carl Eriksson indicated that siting the cabin at 116.83
would place the cabin below grade). Did the "settlement" require Ward to pay Brighton's
attorney's fees. Was allowing Ward to build in the 1999 season a condition of the
settlement? These are just a few examples of the areas of disagreement between the
parties that resulted from the vague and ambiguous nature of the letters which were
determined by the trial court to constitute a binding contract.
The failure of the parties to reach a meeting of minds is perhaps best illustrated by
the issue of the payment of attorney's fees. As set forth in the Statement of Facts,
Brighton maintains that after the proposed settlement, Ward was still required to pay
Brighton's costs of review of plans. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:285).
Ward, on the other hand, believed that to the extent Brighton had the right to require him
to pay its fees as a condition of review, it compromised that right in the settlement that the
trial court ruled to exist. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:477-78). The parties have a
fundamental disagreement on this and other essential terms of the agreement
As a further example, Ward maintains that an essential part of any agreement was
that Brighton would approve his plans in time to allow Ward to build in 1999 building
season. After Brighton delayed approval of the plans, building in the 1999 season
became impossible, thus frustrating any purpose of the settlement and further establishing
a failure of conditions precedent. See Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward (R. 1365).
The parties contemplated that if plans were approved, those plans would be
attached to an order of the court "setting forth all the terms of the settlement." Transcript
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of March 3, 1999 hearing (R. 1745:13). This was never done. The terms of the
settlement were never agreed upon and the agreement ruled to exist by the trial court
lacks sufficient definiteness to be an enforceable agreement. As Mr. Jardine stated on
the record, this matter would be resolved "if this goes through." (R. 1745:15). It didn't
"go through." There were no approved plans, no definite terms agreed upon, no meeting
of the minds, and no settlement.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BRIGHTON'S MOTION TO PAVE
THE PRIVATE ROADWAY ACROSS WARD'S PROPERTY WITHOUT GRANTING
WARD NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
Brighton's request to pave the private roadway across Ward's property was based
on its argument that the parties had a binding settlement agreement in which Ward agreed
that the road could be paved. As set forth above, the settlement was a proposal and there
would not be any settlement until Brighton approved Ward's plans. Perhaps nowhere is
this clearer than on the point regarding the pavement of the roadway, where Brighton's
counsel stated on March 3, 1999, that "one of the issues is whether the road would be
paved. It's our understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the road, at
Brighton Corporation's expense. " March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:15) (emphasis
added). On August 5, 1999, Brighton's counsel wrote to Ward's counsel as follows
regarding pavement of the roadway:
We also recognize that the Property Use Agreement refers to the roadway
easement as a "gravel" roadway. Accordingly, we agree that until the issue
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is resolved, as a practical matter, Brighton can pave the road this year only
with your client's agreement.
August 5, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry (attached as Exhibit B to
Ward's Objection to Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private Roadway) (R. 1360).
Thus, in August 1999, Brighton itself understood that it could not pave the
roadway without Ward's permission, belying its later argument that there was a binding
settlement as of March 1999, that gave it the right to pave the roadway.
The trial court granted Brighton's motion to pave the road without giving Ward
any notice or opportunity to be heard, and in direct contravention of the Property Use
Agreement, thus depriving the defendant of an important property right.12 The United
States and Utah Constitutions provide that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV. See also Utah Const.
Art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.").
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that due process requires, among other
things, inquiry into the merits of the question presented; notice of the purpose of the
inquiry; opportunity to appear in person or by counsel; and fair opportunity to be heard.

12

The trial court's order allowing pavement of the road is even more astonishing in
light of the fact that the court had previously found that the purpose of the restrictive
covenants was to preserve the "rustic nature of the surrounding lands, including the
Subject Property" and to "limit the intrusion of high traffic." October 4, 1994 Order at If
8(R. 312).
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In re: L.G.W.. 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). See also Simon v. Craft. 21 S.Ct. 836, 839
(1901) ("[t]he essential elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to
defend."). This Court has further explained that procedural due process requires "notice
and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid proceeding
affecting life, liberty, or property." Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d
199, 204 (Utah 1984). In addition, "where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a
party of the nature of the proceedings against him or not given sufficiently in advance of
the proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due process." Nelson v.
Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
The Judicial Council and the Supreme Court adopted rules in the Code of Judicial
Administration designed to ensure that parties are given due process of law. One such
rule is found in Rule 4-501, which provides that a party has ten days to oppose a motion.
Rule 4-501(1 )(B), Rules of Judicial Administration. In this case, Ward had absolutely no
notice and no opportunity to be heard with regard to the plaintiffs motion to pave the
roadway. Not only was the trial court's granting of the motion error as explained above
in Point I (based on the lack of a binding settlement agreement), such action by the trial
court was a clear violation of Ward's due process rights. The trial court's order should be
reversed and Brighton ordered to remove the pavement from Ward's Property and restore
Ward's Property to its original condition.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF BRIGHTON REGARDING PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, HAVING A
LICENSED ARCHITECT SIGN PLANS, AND APPLYING FCOZ TO THE PLANS
The trial court erred in granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment
for two reasons: (1) there were disputed facts regarding the factual basis for the motion;
and (2) there is no legal basis for the court to award attorney's fees to Brighton, require
the plans to be signed by a licensed architect, or allow Brighton to apply FCOZ in
examining the plans.
A court deciding a case on summary judgment does not resolve factual issues.
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). "The party
moving for summary judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable
law as applied to an undisputed material issue of fact." Lamb v. B & B Amusements
Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993). The trial court must assess those facts and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from those facts "in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment." Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
The trial court failed to apply these principles when it considered and granted
Brighton's partial summary judgment motion. Brighton's argument in favor of its
summary judgment motion was based on Brighton's factual assertion that Ward had
repeatedly submitted "ambiguous" plans that made it difficult for Brighton to determine
whether the plans were adequate and created expense for Brighton. See Affidavit of
Mary M. Barton at ^f 3 (R. 871-73). Brighton therefore sought to have the court impose
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upon Ward the cost of any review of further plans and require a licensed architect to sign
any plans as a condition of plaintiff s reviewing the plans (an additional unnecessary
expense to Ward).
However, Brighton's assertion that the plans submitted by Ward were ambiguous
was controverted by the affidavit of a licensed architect, who found the plans "clear and
unambiguous." Affidavit of Kimble Shaw atfflf5-6, 10 (attached as Exhibit J to
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) (R. 956). Shaw further
testified that Ward's plans "qualify for any reasonable plan approval process including the
approval process of Salt Lake County required for obtaining a building permit." Id. at ^|
7. Additionally, a certified plan reviewer reviewed Ward's plans and determined that the
plans were "clear and can be easily understood [as] to 'the proposed placement, plans and
design'". (Letter from John J. Saunders, July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 15, p.6). The sole
factual basis for Brighton's summary judgment-that Ward's plans were ambiguous—was
clearly a disputed issue of fact that precluded summary judgment.
Further, there is no legal basis for the relief requested in the summary judgment
motion. The rights and obligations of the parties were clearly spelled out in the Special
Warranty Deed. As stated by this Court, "[a] court will n o t . . . make a better contract for
the parties than they have made for themselves." Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco. Ltd.. 618
P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
None of the requirements Brighton sought to impose on Ward—payment of fees,
use of a licensed architect, or being subjected to FCOZ-are contained in the Special
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Warranty Deed. With regard to FCOZ, Salt Lake County had determined that Ward's
Property was exempt from the ordinance. See August 11, 1998 Certified Letter of Public
Record (R. 924)
In addition, "Utah follows the 'American rule' with regard to awards of attorney
fees. This general rule requires each party to bear his or her own attorney's fees in the
absence of a statute or enforceable contractual provision to the contrary." Cobabe v.
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). There was no legal basis for the
court to allow Brighton an award of fees to review plans submitted to it by Ward.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AT TRIAL TO CONSIDER THE
LATEST SET OF PLANS SUBMITTED TO BRIGHTON BY WARD
On October 22, 1999, the trial court ordered that the parties had entered into an
enforceable settlement agreement and that the issue to be decided at trial was "whether
the plans submitted by Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999 complied with the
criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated letters." November 3,
1999 Order at U 3 (R. 1417-18). Ward submitted plans in April 1999, supplemented those
plans in June 1999, and made further revisions requested by Brighton in August 1999,
which were submitted to Brighton for review on October 6, 1999.
Ward submitted the October 1999 Plans "hoping to get a final review and approval
from Brighton . . . in hope to settle and finally resolve this matter." (R. 1751:474).
Ward's counsel pleaded with Brighton to review the October plans, which contained
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revisions that had been requested by Brighton. See, e.g.. November 1, 1999 letter from
James K. Tracy to James S. Jardine (Trial Exhibit No. 39). Brighton refused to review
the plans and insisted that the trial be on the earlier plans, even though the October Plans
addressed many of the concerns raised by Brighton regarding the June 1999 Supplements.
According to the plain terms of the trial court's order setting forth the issue to be
tried (which order was drafted by Brighton), the trial should have been on whether the
October Plans submitted by Ward (the latest plans) complied with the settlement that the
trial court had ruled on October 22, 1999, existed between the parties.
The trial court ruled that the October Plans "were not properly presented for
review." February 3, 2000 Order at If 2 (R. 1691). The trial court felt that the October
Plans were untimely. At the end of trial, the trial court stated that "all those plans did for
this trial [i.e., the October 1999 Plans] [was to] create some emotional appeal, that you
we're still trying; but it's too late." Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill (R. 1752:577).
Any claim by Brighton and the ruling by the trial court that the October 1999 Plans
were untimely is without merit. There were no deadlines for submitting plans in the
court's November 3, 1999, Order. The trial court did not even establish the issue to be
decided at trial until October 22, 1999, over two weeks after Ward had submitted the
October 1999 Plans to Brighton for review. It was clear that the real reason Brighton
refused to review the plans was not the "timeliness" of the plans, but rather, because
Brighton was insisting on payment of its attorney's fees from prior reviews as a condition
of review. As explained above, even if the trial court had been correct in holding that the
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parties had entered into a settlement, payment of attorney's fees was not a term of the
settlement and it was improper for Brighton to refuse to review the plans on this basis.L>
The trial court's refusal to consider the October 1999 Plans was contrary to the
court's order that the trial would be on the plans submitted by Ward after March 3, 1999.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AT THE TRIAL OF THIS MATTER THAT
BRIGHTON PROPERLY REJECTED WARD'S PLANS
A trial court has a duty to make findings of fact. "The ultimate test of the
adequacy of a trial judge's findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and
pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision." Kunzlerv. O'Dell 855 P.2d 270,
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "The court's findings may be written separately or 'gleaned
from the transcript, the opinion or the memorandum decision.'" Id In this case, the trial
court failed to make specific findings of fact. Judge Young stated at the conclusion of
trial as follows:
So, I told you this was a thumbs-up thumbs-down kind of trial and I find
thumbs down, that the defendant did not comply, so that's the basic finding
that I'm making here. I'm not going to make findings about that."
Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill (R. 1752:598, lines 7-11.
"Unless the record 'clearly and uncontrovertedly supports]' the trial court's
decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more

13

In fact, Brighton's counsel stated on March 3, 1999, that the proposed settlement
would resolve "all other claims" between the parties. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R.
1745:10). Issues regarding attorney's fees are "claims" that would have been resolved.
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detailed findings by the trial court." Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). However, it would serve no purpose to remand this case for additional
findings on the April and June 1999 Plans. Because the trial court erred in not
considering the latest set of plans, any new trial would have to examine a different set of
plans in any event. Further, there are findings that can be "gleaned" from the record upon
which this Court can determine that the plans should have been approved.
1.

The "finality" of Ward's plans. It is clear that the trial court believed that Ward

had submitted plans that were not "final." It appears that the trial court felt it could rule
that the plans were properly rejected on this basis alone. See, e.g. Trial Transcript, Vol.
Ill (R. 1752:594) ("Your clients are in the position now where they have acknowledged
not having filed final plans, and I have no choice in this case but ruling as I will. I cannot
find that there has been compliance by the defendant with the requirements of the
settlement agreement.").14
The fundamental problem with Brighton's argument and Judge Young's "finding"
regarding final plans is that the word "final" was never defined. Kimble Shaw and
Gregory Ward made it clear that no plans would be "final" until Brighton approved the
plans. See, e.g.. Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:501) ("If Brighton Corporation would

14

In closing argument, Brighton argued that it was significant that Ward testified
that although he hoped Brighton would approve his plans, he did not believe that they
would. Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:521). This does not mean that the plans did
not comply with all reasonable requirements that could be imposed by Brighton or that
Brighton should not have approved the plans. It simply reflects the fact that Ward had
lost all confidence that Brighton would ever act in good faith and approve the plans.
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have approved those plans, then they'd be final plans; but since Brighton Corporation
didn't approve those plans underneath the settlement, we wanted to continue to work
towards those and that's why we continued on to October, 1999 plans."); Testimony of
Kimble Shaw (R. 344) ("I would keep adding and deleting information as required, as
requested until we had a clear set of drawings that we could all agree on."). The plans
were never approved by Brighton and therefore, the plans were not "final." They were
"final" in the sense that Ward believed that he had complied with all the requirements
needed to obtain approval. Brighton even stipulated at trial that Ward believed he had
complied with all the requirements necessary for plan approval. See Trial Transcript,
Vol.. II (R. 1751:482).
2.

Detailed drawings of the north porch. Brighton's argument was that a "heavy

black line" was used by Shaw to illustrate the grading for the north porch and that in the
October 28, 1999 letter, Brighton stated that the "heavy black line" was not sufficient.
First, this point illustrates the failure of the parties to reach a meeting of the minds on the
"settlement" and why the "proposed settlement agreement" was too vague and ambiguous
to constitute a binding contract. Ward does not believe that a term of the contract
between the parties was that his architect could not use a heavy black line to illustrate
finished grade. Ward understood that Brighton wanted additional drawings of the north
porch, which were provided to Brighton by Shaw. See Trial Exhibits Nos. 17, 18, 20, 10,
11, and 7.
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On this point, the trial court commented that "[i]f Mr. Shaw tells Mr. Richardson,
that black line means an elevation at such a level, then Mr. Richardson is either going to
have to say, I agree with that or I don't." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:540).

Neil

Richardson, Brighton's expert, never testified that the "heavy black line was insufficient.'
Consequently, trial court would should have found in Ward's favor on this point.
3.

"New" and "proposed" easements. The proposed settlement required Ward to

acknowledge Brighton's waterline easement, which was conceded by Brighton to have
been lowered into the ground and extended from its original position. See, e.g.
Testimony of Mary Barton (R. 1750:142-43). Consequently, there is no dispute that the
waterline is different than it was originally~i.e., it was "extended" by Brighton. Ward
showed the "extension" on the survey and labeled it a "new" and "proposed" easement.
Brighton's sole objection was that Ward used the words "new" and "proposed" to
describe the easements. This description was accurate.
The trial court rejected Brighton's objection on this point, stating that he wasn't
concerned about semantics and that "there's no fundamental objection to this because its
still the same exact location?" Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:86, 143, 148).
4.

Placement of the sewer line. Ward originally placed the sewer line across the

middle of the property because that is where the sewer district contemplated the line
would run and because it would avoid unnecessary destruction of trees. Ward put the
sewer line on the west side of the property on the October 1999 Plans which Brighton
refused to review. The trial court stated that "if the only problem here was the sewer line
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there wouldn't be any problem." Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:257, lines 17-18). In
addition, the trial court stated at the conclusion of trial that, with regard to the location of
the sewer line, "[i]f there were circumstances, for instance, that require cutting down of
trees and other things to go west and along that route and you can go right up a driveway
on the other and there isn't a gravity problem or anything else, then they [Brighton] ought
to be reasonable about that." Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill (R: 1752:597). It is fair to "glean"
from the record that the trial court rejected this point as an adequate basis for Brighton to
reject Ward's plans.
5.

South side patio. Ward proposed terracing the south patio to comply with FCOZ.

Neil Richardson testified that he believed that the tiered retaining wall would not comply
with FCOZ. Kimble Shaw and Greg Ward disagreed. The trial court refused to allow
Ward's expert, Carl Eriksson, to testify on this issue. However, the evidence presented at
trial was that the retaining wall was less than six feet at the comer of the planter box in
question which was used to terrace the wall. See Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:51415). There were no findings of fact made on this issue by the trial court.
6.

Updated survey. First, it is important to note that the October 28, 1998 letter does

not require an updated survey of the entire property. Second, the March 3, 1999 hearing
transcript indicates that an updated survey was only required to address in detail "areas of
disturbance." See Trial Exhibit No. 1 (March 3, 1999 Transcript) at 5, lines 2-4; Trial
Exhibit No. 2 (October 28, 1999 letter) (requesting a copy of the original survey). The
survey submitted by Ward showed adequate detail in the "areas of disturbance." Third,
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Ward's evidence was that an updated survey was provided to Brighton as soon as the
snow in the canyon receded enough to allow a surveyor access to the property.
Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:467); Trial Exhibit No. 46.
Relating to this point, the trial court remarked that although Neil Richardson
testified that he thought the survey that accompanied the June 1999 Supplements wasn't
accurate, Richardson did not address the fact that the survey was done by a bona fide
surveyor and that it was Brighton's burden to show "by some preponderance of the
evidence that his survey's inadequate." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:541, lines 110). This can fairly be read to indicate that the trial court found that the objection to the
survey was not a sufficient basis for Brighton to reject Ward's plans.
7.

Color board and transparency of survey. Ward testified that he had already

given Brighton the color board and the transparency of the survey. Testimony of Greg
Ward. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:447-48, 486-87). According to Brighton, the
"color board" was "not a big deal." Testimony of Mary Barton, Trial Transcript, Vol. I
(R. 1750:132). When Brighton made comments to Ward about his plans, Brighton never
raised the color board or the transparency as an area of noncompliance. Testimony of
Greg Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:488, 534). The trial court did not make any
specific findings on these two issues, but did indicate that it felt it would have been better
for Ward to submit another copy of the color board and the transparency, even if Brighton
already had in its possession identical copies of those items. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R.
1752:539).
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Ward substantially complied with the "settlement" by having previously delivered
a copy of the color board and transparency to Brighton and Ward reasonably relied on
Brighton's failure to raise this as an area of deficiency in its earlier responses to the April
1999 Plans or the June 1999 Supplements. See, e.g.. Cache County v. Beus. 1999 UT
App 134,ffif36-37, 978 P.2d 1043, 1050 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (under doctrine of
substantial compliance, court should determine the materiality of a breach and decide
whether the party has substantially complied).
8.

Corrected version of "support documents/' Mary Barton admitted at trial that

the prior plans submitted by Ward (which included the so-called "support documents")
were not to be withdrawn until Brighton approved Ward's latest plans. Testimony of
Mary Barton (R. 1751:117). Ward testified that he intended to withdraw those "support
documents" at the appropriate time and did not intend to resubmit those documents to Salt
Lake County. Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:533-34).
The purpose of this requirement was Brighton's concern that inaccurate documents
would be on file with Salt Lake County. The requirement presupposes that Ward
intended to refile the support documents. If the documents were not resubmitted to the
county, there would be no need to correct them and submit them to Brighton. The trial
court did not make any reference to this point.

65

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW WARD'S EXPERT AND
FACT WITNESS, CARL ERIKSSON, TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Utah R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added).
The Utah Court of Appeals has explained that n[e]xpert testimony is required
f

[w]here the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular

trades or professions' as in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers."
Preston & Chambers. P.C. v. Koller. 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title. 780 P.2d 821, 826 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). See also Ortiz
v. Geneva Rock Products. Inc.. 939 P.2d 1213, 1217 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Expert
testimony is useful in professions that require a high degree of specialized knowledge
such as engineering); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Company. 711 P.2d 250, 254
(Utah 1985) (trial court erred in refusing to consider the testimony of an engineer relating
to compliance with building code requirements in a case dealing with the negligent design
of retaining walls).
In this case, Brighton argued that it properly rejected Ward's plans because, among
other things, (1) the plans were not "final" plans; (2) the plans did not comply with the
zoning ordinance ("FCOZ"); and (3) Ward's drawings did not have enough detail. Ward
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attempted to call an engineer, Carl Eriksson, who had over 26 years of experience in
reviewing plans for compliance with building and zoning codes, to testify, among other
things, that Ward had submitted a complete set of plans; that the plans complied with
FCOZ; and that Ward's plans were sufficiently detailed and as clear as any plans he had
ever seen.
The trial court had allowed Brighton's architect to testify on these issues.
However, the trial court refused to allow Carl Eriksson to testify on these same issues
because (1) Eriksson had not read the settlement agreement and (2) the court felt that
whether Salt Lake County would approve Ward's plans was irrelevant. Trial Transcript,
Vol. II (R. 1751:233). Mr. Eriksson did not need to read the settlement agreement to
testify as an expert in this case. Mr. Eriksson reviewed the plans and the objections to
those plans and was prepared and qualified to testify on the legitimacy of the objections.
The trial court's second reason for disallowing Mr. Eriksson's testimony
presumably is directed to Mr. Eriksson's testimony as a fact witness. Rule 601 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence provides that every person with personal knowledge is presumed
to be competent to be a fact witness. Utah R. Evid. 601; Utah R. Evid. 602. Mr. Eriksson
had personal knowledge that the design in question had already been approved by Salt
Lake County as complying with FCOZ.
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POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WARD'S 1995 APPLICATION FOR A
DETERMINATION THAT CONSENT TO BUILD THE CABIN HAD BEEN
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD
The trial court erred when it denied Ward's application for a determination that
consent had been unreasonably withheld in 1995, because Brighton's grounds for
rejecting Ward's plans were neither expressed in the restrictive covenants nor reasonable.
After the October 4, 1994 order was issued, enjoining Ward from beginning construction,
Ward submitted revised plans to Brighton that eliminated the basement and the loft and
reduced the square footage of each floor below 1,200 square feet.
The only evidence presented by Brighton in support of the reasonableness of its
rejection of Ward's plans was the testimony of Neil Richardson, who stated that: (1) the
attic could conceivably be converted at some later date to a loft; (2) the pitch of the
proposed cabin!s roof was 8/12 (Richardson asserted that the "preferred" Alpine design in
Utah was a 3/12 pitch), and the plans were ambiguous regarding the total roof height; (3)
the elevations shown on the plans were different than some topographical map previously
provided to Richardson; and (4) in Richardson' opinion, the proposed plans did not meet
the Wasatch Canyons Development Standards.
Each of these grounds for rejection was either unreasonable or against the clear
weight of the evidence. Ward's plans completely eliminated the loft and was designed so
that it was incapable of holding live loads. Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing
(R. 1753:21). There is nothing in the Special Warranty Deed prescribing the pitch of the
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roof. Richardson conceded that the Wasatch Master Plan's study found an 8/12 pitch
acceptable. (R.1753, at 54-55).15 There was no evidence presented at the hearing that the
topography on the proposed plans was wrong. Salt Lake County officials stated that the
plans complied with the Wasatch Canyon Development Standards, were clear in their
presentation, and could easily be understood for an approval process regarding nthe
proposed placement, plans, and design" of the cabin. July 13, 1995 Hearing Exh. No. 15.
In light of Brighton's objections, which were either unsupported by the evidence
or unreasonable, the trial court should have granted Ward's application for a
determination that approval had been unreasonably withheld.
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECUSING JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG AND
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REMOVE JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG FROM
THIS ACTION FOR BIAS AND FOR DENYING WARD HIS DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Ward requests that Judge Young be removed from this case because his unfair
rulings have demonstrated actual bias against Ward. Furthermore, the trial court's
partiality has effectively denied Ward due process. It is axiomatic that parties in a
judicial proceeding are entitled to have their matter heard and decided by a judicial officer
who is free of any hint or suggestion of possible impartiality. This Court has made clear
that, "a judge should recuse himself when his impartiality might reasonably be

15

Brighton's asserting the pitch of the roof as grounds for rejecting Ward's plans
appears even more pretextual and disingenuous in light of the fact that plaintiffs cabin on
the adjoining property has a 12/12 pitch. (R.1753:20; R.1744:270).
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questioned." State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988), cert, denied, 487 U.S.
1220 (1988)) (citing Utah Code of Judicial Conduct). The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that "[a] judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
3E.1 These standards "may require recusal when no actual bias is shown." Neely, 748
P.2datl094.
In 1996, while this case was pending, James Jardine and numerous other attorneys
at Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, who serve as lead counsel for Brighton, played a high profile
and publicly advertised role in Judge Young's closely contested retention election. Ward
asked Judge Young to recuse himself on this basis, but Judge Young refused. The matter
was then referred to Judge Leslie Lewis in accordance with Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. When reviewing the issue, Judge Lewis applied the wrong standard,
erroneously stating that Ward was required to show actual bias in order to obtain Judge
Young's recusal. Court's Ruling by Judge Leslie A. Lewis (R. 718-19). The law is clear
that the burden of showing actual bias should not have shifted to Ward until "[a]fter
[Judge Young] had been approved to continue." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979
(Utah 1998). Judge Lewis should have ordered Judge Young to be recused if his
impartiality might reasonably have been questioned.
Failure to recuse constitutes reversible error if there is "a showing of actual bias or
an abuse of discretion." Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094. However, Ward maintains that the
law requiring a showing of "actual" bias on appeal presupposes that the complaining
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party is seeking to overturn a decision of the trial court based on bias. See, e.g.. State v.
Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988) (stating that failure of judge to recuse himself
where impartiality might reasonably be questioned "does not necessarily mean that the
defendant is entitled to a new trial."); Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 610 (same). Ward is not
requesting that this Court reverse any of Judge Young's rulings on the basis that he was
biased. The Court can overturn those rulings on the clear error encompassed in the
rulings themselves. Ward is simply seeking to have Judge Young removed from future
proceedings regarding this matter to ensure that Ward will obtain an impartial and fair
resolution of this case. Consequently, the reasoning behind requiring a showing of actual
bias is not present and the Court should not apply this higher standard for recusal.
In any event, Ward can show sufficient evidence of actual bias through the
cumulative effect of repeated unfair rulings by Judge Young. Judge Young has
repeatedly prejudged this case, as evidenced on at least two occasions where Judge
Young announced his decisions on motions before he had reviewed them, and before
Ward had an opportunity to respond. The most egregious of these was Judge Young's
order allowing Bnghton to pave a road across Ward's land without providing Ward notice
and an opportunity to be heard.
By ruling that Ward must pay Brighton attorney's fees as a condition of review (on
a summary judgment motion, no less, and in the face of clearly disputed facts), Judge
Young rewrote the Special Warranty Deed and made it impossible for Ward to even get a
review by Brighton, let alone approval.
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Judge Young's unfair rulings continued through trial, where he announced that he
would not consider the latest set of plans submitted to Brighton in October 1999, because
Brighton had refused to review them. Then, Judge Young refused to allow Ward's
witness, Carl Eriksson, to testify regarding whether Ward's plans were deficient as
claimed by Brighton in their case in chief.
When reviewing Judge Young's refusal to recuse himself, Judge Lewis also
questioned the delay in Ward's bringing the motion requesting recusal. While it is true
that the affidavit asserting bias was to be filed "as soon as practicable after the case has
been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known," Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b) (1997), this
requirement had not been dispositively defined under Utah law at the time Ward filed his
motion. In discussing the purpose of the timeliness rule, this Court explained in Madsen
v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n. 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988), that "[a]
party who has a reasonable basis for moving to disqualify a judge may not delay in hope
of first obtaining a favorable ruling and then complain only if the result is unfavorable."
Id. at 542. Such a tactic is not at issue here. Ward filed his affidavit after learning about
the potential for bias before any further rulings were issued by Judge Young. This Court
has recognized that although a motion to disqualify must be made promptly, such a
motion "should not be undertaken lightly." Madsen. 767 P.2d 542. It is one thing to
delay making such a motion until after the judge makes an unfavorable ruling as in
Madsen. It is quite another thing to consider such a motion carefully while nothing
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substantive is happening in the case, and where no one will be prejudiced by such careful
consideration.
Furthermore, Judge Young's bias became even more apparent after Ward filed his
motion seeking recusal. Rule 63(b) provides that "[n]o party shall be entitled in any case
to file more than one affidavit" requesting recusal. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). Thus, Ward
was prohibited from filing another affidavit alleging bias and prejudice, despite the fact
that Judge Young's bias became more pronounced.
Removing Judge Young from presiding over further proceedings in this matter is
the only way to adequately protect Ward's due process rights. Under both the Utah
Constitution and the United States Constitution, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, am.
XIV. One of the most fundamental principles of due process is that "all parties to a case
are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge." Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). As this Court has previously explained, "[a] biased
decision maker is not only constitutionally prohibited, 'but our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.'" Vali Convalescent & Care
Institution v. Industrial Commission, 649 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah 1982) (quoting In re
Murchison. 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 349 U.S.133, 136 (1955)).
Due process demands a new trial "when the appearance of unfairness is so plain
that [the Court is] left with the abiding impression that a reasonable person would find the
hearing unfair." Bunnell v. Industrial Commission. 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n.l (Utah 1987).
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Judge Young's consistently biased rulings can leave this Court and any reasonable person
with no impression other than an impression of unfairness. Ward has been denied the use
of his property for six years because Judge Young has refused to compel Brighton to
exercise its responsibility to grant timely approval of Ward's plans. In fact, by granting
Brighton's ex parte motion to pave the roadway running across Ward's land, Judge Young
has allowed Brighton more use of Ward's land than he has allowed Ward himself.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should grant Ward the following
relief:
1.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in holding that the parties

had entered into a binding and enforceable contract and settlement agreement.
2.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in ruling on summary

judgment (1) that Ward must compensate Brighton for all further costs, including
attorney's fees, associated with any future review by Brighton of any new plans submitted
by Ward as a condition of reviewing those plans; (2) that it was reasonable for Brighton
to require a licensed architect to sign Ward's plans; and (3) that it was reasonable for
Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance of Salt Lake County
in reviewing plans submitted by Ward.
3.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in ruling that Brighton could

pave the roadway over Ward's Property, and that the trial court violated Ward's due
process rights in granting this motion without providing Ward with adequate notice and a
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fair opportunity to be heard. In addition, the Court should order that Brighton remove the
pavement and restore Ward's Property to its original condition.
4.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the

latest set of plans submitted to Brighton by Ward and should direct the trial court that any
future hearings must be held on the latest set of plans submitted by Ward.
5.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in holding that Brighton

properly rejected the plans submitted by Brighton to Ward in 1999, and that Ward is
allowed to build either the April 1999 Plans or the October 1999 Plans if he so desires.
6.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Carl

Eriksson to testify as an expert and as a fact witness at the trial of this matter.
7.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in refusing to rule that

Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the plans submitted by Ward at the July
13, 1995 hearing, and should further rule that Ward may build those plans if he so desires.
8.

The Court should rule that the trial court erred in not recusing Judge Young

from this case and that Judge Young should be removed from this case and the case
reassigned due to Judge Young's bias and denying Ward his due process rights
throughout the proceedings below.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

K

day of July, 2000.

LeBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MacRAE, L.L.P.

Attorneys for Appellant Gregory M. Ward
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BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , organised and e x i s t i n g
under the l a v s of t h e S t a t e o f Utah, w i t h i t s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e a t S a l t
Lako C i t y , o f County o f S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah. GRANTOR, hereby
CONVEYS AND WARRANTS a g a i n s t a l l c l a i m i n g by, through or under i t t o
ISABEL M. COATS and HALTER H. COATS, as J o i n t T r u s t e e s of the I s a b e l
M. C o a t s T r u s t d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 5 , GRANTEE8, o f M e r c e d ,
C a l i f o r n i a , - f o r t h e sum o f TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) and o t h e r good and
v a l u a b l e con s i d e r a t l o n s , t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d t r a c t of land i n
S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utahi
B e g i n n i n g a t t h e N o r t h w e s t c o r n e r of Lot 29, Block 4,
S i l v e r Lake Summer R e s o r t , a c c o r d i n g t o the o f f i c i a l
p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e and o f r e c o r d i n t h e S a l t Lake
County R e c o r d e r ' s o f f i c e ,
and r u n n i n g t h e n c e South
87 o 33*0 a East along t h e North l i n e of s a i d Lot 29, 115.5
f e e t (Record e q u a l s E a s t ) ; t h e n c e South 2 ° 2 7 , 0 * N e s t
198.5 f e e t t o t h e S o u t h boundary l i n e o f G r a n t o r ' s
p r o p e r t y ; t h e n c e N o r t h 8 7 ° 3 3 ' 0 " West a l o n g t h e South
bouidry l i n e of Grantor's property 115.5 f e e t (being the
property conveyed t o Grantor under Warranty Deed dated
1 / 2 8 / 6 1 AB r e c o r d e d 8 / 2 / 6 1 as e n t r y number 1791991 In
Book 1827 Page 346 i n the o f f i c e of the S a l t Lake County
R e c o r d e r ) ; t h e n c e N o r t h 2 ° 2 7 ' 0 a E a s t 198.5 f e e t (Deed
e q u a l s North) t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g . (Cont. .5263
a c r e s more or l e s s )
Basis of bearing:
L i n e b e t w e e n the S a l t Lake County
Monument found a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Pine S t r e e t and
Wasatch S t r e e t t o S a l t Lake County Mounument found i n
Prospect Street*
S a i d l i n e b e i n g South 28 Degrees 48
M i n u t e s 47 S e c o n d s E a s t AS s u r v e y e d .
B e a r i n g s were
r o t a t e d 2 D e g r e e s 27 M i n u t e s c l o c k w i s e as needed t o
conform t o s t r e e t c e n t e r l i n e d a t a a s shown on t h e S a l t
Lake County area r e f e r e n c e , p l a t f o r S e c t i o n 35, Township
2 South, Range 3 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian.
RESERVING unto the Grantor, i t s s u c c e s s o r s and a s s i g n s ,
a permanent e a s e m e n t and r i g h t - o f - w a y f o r roadway and
u t i l i t y p u r p o s e s o v e r and a c r o s s t h e h e r e i n a f t e r
d e s c r i b e d p r e m i s e s t o be u s e d i n common by the Grantor
and G r a n t e e h e r e i n , and o t h e r named Grantees of t h e
Grantor for c o n s t r u c t i o n , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , maintenance,
and r e p a i r of a r o a d w a y f o r l n g r e a s and e g r e s s and
u t i l i t y easements for waterllnea,
eewer l i n e s ,
e l e c t r i c a l l l n e e , t e l e p h o n e l i n e a , n a t u r a l gaa l l n e a ,
and o t h e r u t i l i t i e s i n c i d e n t a l t o a r e s i d e n t i a l u s e , t o wit!
B e g i n n i n g a t t h e S o u t h w e s t c o r n e r of Lot 29, Block 4,
S i l v e r Lake Summer Resort according t o the o f f i c i a l p l a t
t h e r e o f on f i l e and of r e c o r d i n t h e S a l t Lake County
R e c o r d e r ' s O f f i c e , and r u n n i n g t h e n4c e South 87°33*0*
E a e t 115.5 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 2°87 0* Weat 20 f e e t ;
• t h e n c e North * 7 ° 3 3 ' 0 * Weat 115.5 f e e t ; t h e n c e North
2 ° 2 7 ' 0 * 20 f e e t t o the p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g .
The above-named Or an t o r , Grantee, and o t h e r named Grantees t h e r e o f
s h a l l use the easements and r i g h t - o f - w a y e granted by t h i s inatrument
i n common w i t h due r e g a r d t o t h e r i g h t s of o t h e r s and t h e i r u s e of
such eaeements and r i g h t - o f - w a y s , and such eaaements and r i g h t - o f - w a y s
s h a l l not be ueed i n Any way t h a t w i l l impair the r i g h t s of o t h e r s t o
use i t .
No party s h a l l i n any way o b s t r u c t the use of s a i d easements
and r i g h t - o f - w a y * t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of o t h e r a h o l d i n g 4 b e n e f i c i a l
interest therein.
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Grantor further reserves unto i t s e l f , i t a eucceeeore and asslgna,
•rnancnt waterllne uaso»*nt as the tame now e x l s t a under tha abovti rribed pramlaea convoyed hare in for tha now axiating raaidantial
-4 ©rline to the raaidance on Crantor'a proparty together with tha
r« - t of lngraaa and agraat for tha maintenance aud rapalr of aaid
n
ting watar Una.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. Tha above-deecribed premlaea ahall ba
- i t i t e d to tha c o n s t r u c t i o n of a a i n g l a r a a i d a n t i a l b u i l d i n g
containing not In axcaet of t - e l v e hundrad aquara faat on aach floor,
~, containing not more than two f l o o r s , Outalda dacklng not undar
roof ahall not ba includad in aaid t w e l v e hundrad aquara foot
^.aitation.
Grantor axpraaaly reserves the r i g h t t o ravlaw and approve the
propoaad placement, plans, and daalgna for any improvements to be
l o c a t e d upon'tha above-described property, which approval ahall be
timely and ahall not be unreasonably withheld*
Subject to an axiating right-of-way agreement datad September 12,
'95 0, between Brighton Corporation aa Grantor And David 8. Dranaflald
and Sarah Adelle Dranaflald.aa Grantees, togathar* with othara in
common aa recorded September 18, 1990, in Book 6253 Page 2002, entry
Number 4967074 in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Subject to that certain waterllne easement dated June 10, 1991,
from Brighton Corporation, Grantor, to S i l v e r Lake Company, Grantee of
a prepetual waterllne eaaement 10 f e e t in width extending along the
Western property line of the premises conveyed herein.
Subject to any and a l l other existing right-of-waye and eaaaaenta
of record.
Subject to the restriction that upon the tranafer or a a l e o f the
above-described premises the named Grantor and i t a aucceasors and
a s s i g n s who are descendants of Mary h. Barton are granted a f i r s t
r i g h t of refuaal for the purchaae thereof, and Fred A. Koreton and
Lucy W. Koreton and t h e i r deacendanta are granted a aecond right of
refuaal for the purchase thereof. A s a l e or t r a n a f e r of the abovedescribed premlaea to the deacendanta of I s a b e l K. Coata ahall be
exempt from aaid described f i r s t and aecond righta of refuaal but said
terma ahall be binding upon the tranafer of aaid premlaea to any party
not a descendant of Isabel K. Coats.
The o f f i c e r s who sign t h i s deed hereby c e r t i f y that t h i s ueed and
the t r a n a f e r r e p r e a e n t e d t h e r e b y wae d u l y a u t h o r i s e d under a
resolution duly adopted by the Board of Dlrectora of the Grantor at a
lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Orantor has cauaed i t s corporate name and
aeal to be hereunto affixed b y . i t s duly a u t h o r i z e d o f f l c e r a this
_JXjiay of 3 * g i
, 1991.

cr
STATE Of UTAH

•••BRIGHTON CORPORATION a Utah corporation,

)

BY t X ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ U ^
KtrY rtortton Barton, President

t aa.

County of Salt Lake)
On the 3** day of Q ~ £ u 1991, b e f o r e me, the undersigned, a
notary PublicTn and f o r "
o/County and S t a t e , p e r e o n a i l y appeared
KARY KORETON BARTON, known to be to be the P r e s i d e n t . o f BRXGHTOK
CORPORATION, the corporation that executed the within instrument, ana
known to me to be the person who executed the w i t h i n instrument on
behalf of the corporation herein named, and he duly acknowledged tome
that aaid corporation executed the aame in pureuanoe._.o£/e_* resolution
of ita Board of Oirectora.
j
vf _
My Commieaion Explresi

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing a t t

r^
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Exhibit B

PROPERTY USE AGREEMENT
T h i s Agreement i s made t h i s
among BRIGHTON CORPORATION,
BARTON, h e r e i n a f t e r

^?

day of

/^^^l

a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,

collectively

'

and MARY M.

to as "BRIGHTON",

and

ISABEL M. COASTS and WALTER H. COATS, as J o i n t T r u s t e e s of

the

ISABEL M. COATS TRUST d a t e d
COATS,

Individually,

"COATS",

referred

1951

'

December 10,

hereinafter

and FRED A.

1905,

collectively

and ISABEL M.
referred

MORETON and LUCY W. MORETON,

Tenants, h e r e i n a f t e r c o l l e c t i v e l y
WHEREAS, BRIGHTON has s o l d

as

to as
Joint

referred to as "MORETON".
to COATS a c e r t a i n p a r c e l

of

p r o p e r t y 115.5 f e e t by 198.5 f e e t from the W e s t e r l y p o r t i o n of
the Brighton property,
of

p r o p e r t y of

274.25
Brighton

feet

and BRIGHTON has sold to MORETON a parcel

the d i m e n s i o n s of a p p r o x i m a t e l y

constituting

the

most

Easterly

112.5 f e e t by

portion

of

the

property,

NOW, THEREFORE, i t

i s hereby AGREED among the p a r t i e s

as

follows in regard to the use of said p r o p e r t i e s :
1.
owners,

That as between BRIGHTON and COATS as adjacent property
each party a g r e e s

t h a t what p r e s e n t l y c o n s i s t of

the

Easterly and Southerly p o r t i o n of the e x i s t i n g c i r c u l a r driveway
and the p r o p e r t y
restored

in the

to a n a t u r a l

immediate

state

vicinity

of w i l d f l o w e r s ,

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the e x i s t i n g a r e a .

thereof

will

be

aspen and p i n e ,

The r e s t o r e d area w i l l be

m a i n t a i n e d by the r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t y owners w i t h no v e h i c u l a r
parking thereon.

The e x i s t i n g p i n e s ,

aspen and briar w i t h i n

the

present c i r c u l a r driveway w i l l not be removed by e i t h e r party and
w i l l remain as a buffer zone between the two adjacent p a r c e l s .
2.

For p u r p o s e s of

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o n l y in t h i s agreement

the COATS property s h a l l be referred to as Parcel A, the BRIGHTON
p r o p e r t y as P a r c e l B and the MORETON p r o p e r t y as P a r c e l C as t o
the South 140.5 f e e t t h e r e o f and P a r c e l 2 as to the North 122.5
feet

thereof.
3.

BRIGHTON and MORETON a g r e e t h a t MORETON w i l l not make

any a p p l i c a t i o n for a b u i l d i n g permit nor w i l l MORETON c o n s t r u c t
a r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i n g on p a r c e l C of t h e i r purchased p r o p e r t y ,

but t h a t MORETON w i l l p l a c e any r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i n g which i t
d e s i r e s to c o n s t r u c t on Parcel 2 of the purchased property.
4.

BRIGHTON hereby g r a n t s unto COATS and d e s c e n d a n t s

first* right

of

refusal

to

purchase

the

remaining

the

BRIGHTON

CORPORATION p r o p e r t y and BRIGHTON hereby g r a n t s to MORETON and
descendants the second r i g h t of r e f u s a l to purchase the remaining
BRIGHTON CORPORATION property.

If

such purchas

rights

e x e r c i s e d by t h o s e p a r t i e s owning the p r i o r i t i e s

are not

to purchase,

t h e n the owner may s e l l the same t o an o u t s i d e p u r c h a s e r on the
same terms and c o n d i t i o n s
holding

the f i r s t

t h a t the same were o f f e r e d

to those

r i g h t of purchase and second right of purchase

r e f e r r e d to in t h i s paragraph.
5.

COATS, BRIGHTON, and MORETON agree to p a r t i c i p a t e in the

e x p e n s e of m a i n t e n a n c e of the road r i g h t - o f - w a y e q u a l l y as t o
t h a t p o r t i o n which c r o s s e s

the COATS p r o p e r t y .

BRIGHTON and

MORETON a g r e e to s h a r e e q u a l l y in the maintenance and c o s t s of
the road r i g h t - o f - w a y s
give

ingress

as the same c r o s s the BRIGHTON property to

and e g r e s s

to

the

MORETON p r o p e r t y ,

D r a n s f i e l d and Sarah Adele D r a n s f i e l d ,

David

S.

who are the owners of a

r i g h t - o f - w a y f o r i n g r e s s and e g r e s s a c r o s s the COATS, BRIGHTON
and MORETON p r o p e r t i e s s h a l l be o b l i g a t e d t o . c o n t r i b u t e to the
parties

for

their

fair

and

proportionate

share

c o n s t r u c t i o n and maintenance on such r i g h t - o f - w a y s .
parties

hereto

Dransfields

to

shall
the

extends upon each of

receive

extent

that

compensation
the

from

Dransfield

of

road

Each of the
the

named

right-of-way

the p r o p e r t i e s of the named p a r t i e s to

this

agreement.
6.

The p a r t i e s h e r e t o a g r e e t h a t the d e s i g n a t e d 20 f o o t

right-of-way

as d e s c r i b e d on the deed from Brighton to Coats as

u s e d f o r roadway p u r p o s e s s h a l l c o n s i s t of a s i n g l e l a n e g r a v e l
roadway for v e h i c u l a r t r a v e l ,

and that there s h a l l be no parking

of any v e h i c l e s on the roadway p o r t i o n or on e i t h e r s i d e of the
roadway p o r t i o n w i t h i n s a i d 20 f o o t width right-of-way.
all

utilities

Any and

i n s t a l l e d w i t h i n the boundaries of said designated CT*
CO

20 f o o t r i g h t - o f - w a y s h a l l be c o n s t r u c t e d in compliance with
e x i s t i n g S a l t Lake County o r d i n a n c e s .

thenj^
c*

NOTWITHSTANDING any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s hereof or any o t h e r
p r o v i s i o n s of the Deed of Conveyance from Brighton to C o a t s ,

it

i s e x p r e s s l y agreed among the p a r t i e s h e r e t o that C o a t s , at i t s
s o l e expense, may at any time r e l o c a t e said 20 foot
referred <o in the Coats Deed, any d i s t a n c e
to the North of

i t s present location,

right-of-way,

i t may e l e c t

farther

so long as any such new

r i g h t - o f - w a y connects to the now e x i s t i n g roadway on the Brighton
property

(B)

at

the

common p r o p e r t y

line

between

the

Coats

p r o p e r t y (A) and s a i d B r i g h t o n p r o p e r t y , and s u b j e c t f u r t h e r to
the c o n d i t i o n that the curvature on any such new right-of-way
it

transvers.es

as

the Coats p r o p e r t y s h a l l be e n g i n e e r e d in such

manner that the S a l t Lake County f i r e equipment serving said area
can n e g o t i a t e

such roadway w i t h o u t d i f f i c u l t y .

expense,

c o n d u c t a s u r v e y and obtaHrn* a metes and bounds

will

Coats, at

survey d e s c r i p t i o n of such proposed new right-of-way as i t
t r a v e r s e the Coats p r o p e r t y (A) and c o n n e c t with the
road r i g h t - o f - w a y

its

shall

existing

at the common property l i n e with the Brighton

p r o p e r t y (B).
As f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n

t o B r i g h t o n and Moreton f o r

the

granting of the p r i v i l e g e to Coats to r e l o c a t e said r i g h t - o f - w a y ,
Coats covenants and agrees that Coats w i l l not erect any type of
b u i l d i n g or s t r u c t u r e upon that portion of the Coats property (A)
w i t h i n the b o u n d a r i e s of

the o l d Forest A l l e y (as v a c a t e d )

or

upon Lot 29.
At such time as any such new r i g h t - o f - w a y i s agreed upon by
the p a r t i e s
above-herein,
as d e s c r i b e d

in accordance
it
in

with

i s agreed that
the

Coats

the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s
the former 20 foot

Deed s h a l l

set

forth

right-of-way

be r e l e a s e d .

It

is

understood and agreed by the p a r t i e s hereto that the r i g h t - o f - w a y
in f a v o r of David S. D r a n s f i e l d and Sarah Adele D r a n s f i e l d
ingress

and e g r e s s

to

their

property

will

be a d j u s t e d

tranverse under or across such newly designated right-of-way,
that t h e i r p r i o r r i g h t - o f - w a y

for
to
and

reserved over and across the Coats
CD

property (A) s h a l l

thereupon be r e l e a s e d by them.
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7.

The 1991 p r o p e r t y

t a x e s upon the r e s p e c t i v e

properties

as p u r c h a s e d o r r e t a i n e d by t h e named p a r t i e s s h a l l be p r o - r a t e d
among

them

relying

as

of

the

date

upon the 1991 S a l t

Commencing J a n u a r y 1,
i t s r e s p e c t i v e tax
0.

respective

conveyances,
Billings.

each p a r t y s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e

for

assessments.

BRIGHTON h e r e b y g r a n t s t o MORETON a 50 y e a r l e a s e upon

to* t h e S o u t h of

which

their

Lake County T r e a s u r e r ' s Tax

1992,

the p r o p e r t y s p e c i f i c a l l y
and

of

is

hereby

BRIGHTON f u r t h e r

d e s c r i b e d as P a r c e l C l y i n g

Parcel

2 for

acknoweldged
covenants

t h e sum of $1.00,

by BRIGHTON from

adjacent

receipt

MORETON,

of
and

t h a t upon r e q u e s t of MORETON i t

will

convey s a i d p a r c e l C by a S p e c i a l Warranty Deed from BRIGHTON t o
MORETON f o r
restriction

the

consideration

t h a t MORETON w i l l

upon s a i d P a r c e l C.
exclusive

first

of

ONE DOLLAR s u b j e c t

not b u i l d

BRIGHTON f u r t h e r

right

to

renew

P a r c e l C a t any time b e f o r e

a residential

to

the

structure

g r a n t s u n t o MORETON t h e

s a i d -50 y e a r l e a s e

upon

the e x p i r a t i o n of the f r i s t

said

50 y e a r s ,

f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of ONE DOLLAR, and MORETON s h a l l h a v e

the

right

for

to continue

said premises,

to e n t e r

i n t o s u c c e s s i v e 50 y e a r l e a s e s

in t h e e v e n t

that

MORETON has n o t r e q u e s t e d

a

conveyance of the same from BRIGHTON,
9 .

As b e t w e e n BRIGHTON and MORETON t h e y r e s e r v e t h e

right

t o c h a n g e t h e r o u t e of t h e e x i s t i n g roadway as i t c r o s s e s

their

r e s p e c t i v e p r e m i s e s upon d e t e r m i n a t i o n by
that a different

d e s c r i p t i o n would be more p r a c t i c a l and s e r v e

them and the D r a i n s f i e l d s
of

them from a s u r v e y

in a b e t t e r way.

the roadway and u t i l i t y

The W e s t e r l y

easement as i t c r o s s e s over and under

the COATS p r o p e r t y may not be changed w i t h o u t the e x p r e s s
c o n s e n t of t h e COATS p r o p e r t y o w n e r .
the

parties

Dransfield

hereto

and

should e l e c t

David S.
in w r i t i n g

and u t i l i t y easement t o a d i f f e r e n t
various property owners,

portion

written

In t h e e v e n t t h a t a l l of

Dransfield

and Sarah

t o move the e x i s t i n g

Adele
roadway

location'as it Intersects

the

t h e n i f such new easement i s agreed upon

by t h e p a r t i e s and c o n v e y e d by r e s p e c t i v e d e e d s of e a s e m e n t a s CD
n e c e s s a r y , and if such u t i l i t y easement does, in f a c t , make water

^
ID

a v a i l a b l e to the e x i s t i n g BRIGHTON residence,

then in such event,

BRIGHTON a g r e e s t o r e l e a s e the COATS p r o p e r t y from the c e r t a i n
permanent water i i n ^ r i g h t - o f - w a y
across

the COATS p r o p e r t y

to serve

which i t now owns over ar^
the now e x i s t i n g

BRIGHTON

residence.
10.

The w i t h i n a g r e e m e n t s h a l l be b i n d i n g upon t h e p a r t i e s

h e r e t o and a l l of
descendants,

their

respective

successors,

assigns,

and

and the t e r m s h e r e o f s u p e r c e d e any and a l l p r i o r

o r a l a g r e e m e n t s in ar\y

wav

e n t e r e d i n t o or among t h e p a r t i e s i n

r e s p e c t to the s u b j e c t m a t t e r s s e t forth herein.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t h i s Agreement i s executed the day an<j
year p r e v i o u s l y s e t f^rth above h e r e i n .
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation
'Its

JPfe'sident

MARY M. ^BARTON', I n d i v i d u a l l y
'"Brighton"
WALTER M. COATS and ISABEL M.
COATS, as J o i n t Trustees of the
I s a b e l M. Coats Trust dated
12/1Q/JB5

WITNESS
WITNESS

J
(Cs

y

/,/*

ISABEL M. COATS/ Trustee

jy/> fas ^/^~^

WALTER M. COATS, Trustee

L>7
f/y^f^A^—
WITNESS i^C<^^^^/7£K>~

^

ISABEL M. COATS, I n d i v i d u a l l y
, ^/
"COATS"

WITNESS
K>r-^

/>j#dcz-,</

WITNESS :^CL^^Ar^mZX^

s <rtt>&y y7 FTORETQN

/

^ —

y^ORE^ON"

CD

00
V£>
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Exhibit C

CERTIFIED COPY

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

SALT LAKE COUNT!, STATE OF UTAH

3

BRIGHTON CORPORATION,
4

Plaintiff,
5

vs.
6
7
8

10

ISABEL M. COATS and
WALTER M. COATS, et al.

Case No. 940905453

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3r<1 day of March, 1999,

11
the above-entitled matter came on for Hearing before the
12
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, sitting as Judge in the above13
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the
14
following audiotape proceedings were had.
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

E0E

23
24

ASSOCIATED

PROFESSIONAL

REPORTERS,

LC

A P P E A R A N C E S
2 (For the Plaintiff;
JAMES S. JARDINE, ESQ
SCOTT A. HAGEN, ESQ.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

3

For the Defendant;

DOUGLAS J. PARRY, ESQ.
PARRY MURRAY & WARD

7
Salt Lake City, Utah
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

84111

3
1 II

THE COURT:

Good morning.

The record may 6how we're

2 A convened in the matter of Brighton Corporation,
3 i corporation,

versus

Isabel

Coats

and Walter

a Utah

Coats,

et

al.

4 | The case is 940905453. This is the date set for trial,
5 | Counsel, will you first state your appearances, please.
6I

MR. JARDINE:

James Jardine and Scott Hagen for the

7 I Plaintiff, Brighton Corporation,
8 |

MR. PARRY:

Douglas Parry for the Defendants.

9 I

THE COURT:

I€ve been informed informally that there€s

10 I a stipulated resolution of this case, is that correct?
11

MR. PARRY:

If it can be stated correctly, yes.

12

THE COURT:

Okay. Who will state it then correctly?

13 J

MR. JARDINE: Well, I have a lot of affection for Mr.

14 I Parry; I have no doubt that he'll criticize me in some
15 V fashion for the way I do this, Your Honor, but—
16 I

THE COURT:

Okay.

17

MR. JARDINE:

It, in fact, Your Honor, is a conditional

18 | settlement we'd like to read into the record.

It's

19 | conditional because certain actions remain to be taken.
20

THE COURT:

21 |

MR. JARDINE:

22

Okay.
We propose t o s t a t e t h e agreement on t h e

record—

23 I

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

24

MR. JARDINE:

—and then to formalize it later in an

25 H order for the Court to sign, if the remaining i66ues and

4

1 g actions are satisfactorily resolved.

And we would ask the

2 U Court to continue the trial date, and I think Mr- Parry will
3 | speak to that.

We've agreed that we will review the

4 | contemplated plans to be submitted to us, within seven days
5

of receiving them, and I think Mr. Parry will ask you about

6 I available trial dates within that time frame•
7 |

Let me see if I can state the agreement, and then we

fj can deal with the trial date later.
9 1
10 I

THE COURT:
MR. JARDINE:

Okay.

All right.

We sent a letter, dated October 28, 1998/

11 | to counsel for Mr. Ward, proposing a settlement and listing
12

a number of issues.

It46 our understanding that Defendants

13 I have accepted the terras of that letter, with some additions
14 A and some corrections, which I will attempt to state.
15 I

As a sort of principal point, the letter contemplates,

16 I and the parties agree, that Mr. Ward will submit plans,
17 | signed by an architect, to—for review to Brighton
18 I Corporation.
19

The parties have agreed that the plans will

meet the requirements of listing of what should be included

20 I of two checklists provided last night by Neil Richardson to
21 J Kimball Shaw, with three exceptions.

They would not need to

22 | include work of a landscape architect.
23 |

MR. PARRY:

24 |

MR. JARDINE:

25 | analysis.

1

Correct.
They would not need to include a slope

5
1

UNIDENTIFIED:

2

MR. JARDINE:

Okay •
And the updated and detailed survey need

3 only address in detail what are called "areas of
4

disturbance" by the architects.

5 II

MR, PARRY:

Correct•

6

THE COURT:

Okay,

7

MR. JARDINE:

8

Another change is that the letter of

October 28, 199B, addresses the proposed patio on the south

9 | and west of the proposed cabin. We modified our position on
10 1 that patio in a letter dated February 22, 1999, and that
11 U supersedes the October 28, 1998, letter on that issue and,
2

in general, says that they may have a patio of the outlying

13 | of the plans submitted to us, so long as it is step-down in
14 | compliance with "F" Cause, a6 to the cut,
15 I

There remains an issue outstanding that the future

16 1 pl a n G submitted to U6 will address, which is the location
17 | and design of the porch or front entrance proposed on the
18 I north side-

Brighton Corporation has not received final

19 plans that they regard as adequate for that proposal,
20 H including grading plans, <knd Brighton Corporation will
2i J review the plans submitted to determine whether the proposed
22 H pl an / ^ n that respect, adversely impacts its water line, and
73 6 t h e

arc

hitects

ta

lked la6t night about what the detail would

24 S k e needed for that review to be done.
25 |

Otherwise, the letters talk—the list includes a number

6

1 || of things, and I ju6t—I think it*s clear, but the plans
2 H will also include reference to where permanent parking would
3 I be and, also, how construction—there1 d be a description of
4

how construction would be staged.

5 |

As I said, the final plans, as described in the letters

6 I and as I've described today, will be submitted to Brighton
7 A Corporation, which will, with its architect, review the
8 | plans and respond within seven days of receiving them.
9 I

Brighton Corporation, we—the parties agree that

10 | Brighton Corporation cannot pre-approve the plans until it
11 | sees them, but if the issues raised in the letters of
12 I October 28, 1998, and February 22, 1999, and the noted
13 | ambiguities are addressed and resolved, Brighton Corporation
14 & is not presently aware of other grounds on which it would
15 I disapprove the plans.
16 I

There are other issues to address,. in terms of the

17fiProposed settlement.

A term of the proposed settlement is

18 I that Mr. Ward will withdraw all plans filed to date with the
19

county and only file, in the future, plans approved by

20 | Brighton Corporation and the Court.

Mr. Ward has expressed

21 J a concern that, under *F" Cause, there may be an argument
22 I that he is barred from building on his lot.

The provision

2 3 | in question, as I understand it, is provision 19.72.030,
24 I 'Development Standards,* and under that, paragraph 2(b),
25 | which 6ay6:

"If— Lots of record that meet unHAritfU-

—

7
1 | minimum lot size requirement.

If the underlying zone

2 II permits a minimum lot size of smaller than one acre, then a
3 | lot of record, approved prior to the effective date of the
4 | ordinance codified in this chapter, that meets the minimum
5 | lot size requirement set forth in the underlying zone
6 I district, shall have a minimum lot size of one-half acre."
7 A Brighton Corporation stipulates, and I think both the
8 | parties stipulate, that this lot was created prior to the
.9 I effective date, is greater than one-half acre and,
10 | therefore, would not be precluded from building. And we
11

stipulate further that you may include such a provision in

12 | the final order so that that could be shown to the county.
13 I

I should note that it is a condition of this settlement

14 I for Ward that if the county takes a different position, not
15 I withstanding that, and refuses to recognize that, then the
16 | settlement is not effective and Mr. Ward would be back in
17 | his prior position.
18

Did I state that correctly?

19

MR. PARRY:

20

Yes.

I'm wondering whether we need to go

that far on it, though.

It may be that we can make some

21 I sort of an adjustment to build on.
22

THE COURT:

There i 6 —

You need to be sure your voice i6 being

23 | heard clearly, Mr. Parry.
24 |

MR. PARRY:

Yeah, I'll 6tand.

25 I 9° that far back, but—

I*m not sure we want to

8
1

THE COURT:

Well, &6 I understand that provision, what

2

they're saying is, you will cooperate with the grandfather

3

status that was granted to that lot at an earlier time.

4

MR. JARDINE:

Here is the issue.

We—that I think we

5

want to be clear on—we do not intend, have no desire to

6

have Mr. Ward adversely affected by that requirement.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. JARDINE:

9

Sure.
And we'll stipulate and have entered into

an order any way to make sure that that requirement doesn't

10

bar his being able to build.

11

however, is that all these prior plans, which are a source

12

of contention between the parties, get withdrawn and—

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. JARDINE:

We—what the agreement is,

Right.
—that only the plans filed are ones

15

we've approved and you've approved, and that we understood,

16

if that was taken care of, that wasn't a problem.

17

why we structured it that way.

So that's

18

MR. PARRY:

19

plans are withdrawn—

20

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

21

MR. PARRY:

—that the county will then say this is

Yeah.

And our worry is that if all the

22

something new, and we readdress this issue.

23

could get an order from the Court that says the Court ha6

24

found that it fits within that exception, therefore, c a n —

25

you know, anything—we're not adverse, obviously, to

You know, if we

9
1 | withdrawing the plans2

THE COURT:

We ju6t want to build the cabin-

You just don't want to be prejudiced by

3

that withdrawal, in the event that they say you're starting

4

afresh?

5

MR- PARRY:

That's correct-

And we're—

6

THE COURT:

Well, and then I think they're—I think Mr.

7

Jardine's position is consistent with supporting that

8

position.

9

MR- PARRY:

I think so.

I just wanted it (inaudible).

10

THE COURT:

So, I would be happy to sign a stipulated

11 1 order that indicates that the withdrawal of the plans is not
12

& withdrawal of the date of the filing, but simply the

13 | content of the plans.
14

MR. PARRY:

Yeah.

15 I

MR. JARDINE:

That—that would probably work.

I think that's not a problem and, indeed,

16 I I think if we have an order just saying that this is a lot
17 A in excess of a half acre and was created prior to the
18

effective date, and the parties stipulate, and the Court so

19

orders that this doesn't bar building on this lot, that's

20

what they really need-

21 I

THE COURT:

Okay.

That would be fine.

22 |

MR* PARRY:

My only concern, Jim, is I think it's le66

23 | than a half acre, but (inaudible).
24 |

MR. WARD:

It's ,53.

25 |

MR. JARDINE:

We agree.

10
1

MR. PARRY:

Well, that's over.

2

MR. JARDINE:

We agree it's over a half acre, so it's

3 not an issue.
4

MR. PARRY:

Okay.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6

MR. JARDINE:

7

MR. HAGEN:

8

MR. JARDINE:

All right, fine.

(Inaudible).
It can't be less than (inaudible).
All right.

Next, there has been an issue

9 about conforming the legal description of the roadway
10

easement in the Special Warranty Deed to actually reflect

11

the—

12

THE COURT:

To the location.

13

MR. JARDINE:

—that—where it's actually located.

And

14

I think we're in agreement that that can be done. And I've

15

made a—the one thing we didn't finally decide is, I've made

16

a proposal that, since they're going to have a surveyor

17

updating his survey, that they get the exact—have him

18

include in his work the exact legal description of the road,

19

and we'll bear the co6t of having the new deed prepared.

20

Next, with regard to Brighton Corporation's waterline

21

easement, which comes aero6s the property, the proposed

22

resolution is that the claim of trespass and relocation

23

would be dismissed, if everything else is resolved; that the

24 8 parties would agree that there is an 18-foot easement for

25 the waterline, but that Brighton Corporation can only have a

11
1 I waterline within that easement, no other utilities or other
2

uses; and that the final order would specifically say that

3flBrighton Corporation may go on Ward's property only to
4

repair the—repair and maintain the line, and only upon

5 | reasonable notice of when it intends to do so to Mr. Ward,
6 |

MR. PARRY:

Written?

7 |

MR. JARDINE:

8

THE COURT:

Written?

That's fine, it can be written.

I'm assuming that that would exclude some

9 | kind of emergency situation.

A waterline—

10 I

MR. PARRY:

Yeah.

11

THE COURT:

A waterline is something that can have a

12
13 |

sudden break.
MR. JARDINE:

I assumed that—my use of the word

14 | •reasonable"—
15

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

16 |

MR. JARDINE:

— I thought meant that if you have an

17 | emergency, immediate dealing with it is reasonable—
18

MR, PARRY:

(Inaudible).

19

MR. JARDINE:

—and the only problem i6 that written

20 U notice then makes that more difficult.

Any problem with

2i | having that clarification?
22

MR- PARRY:

No, that's a fine clarification.

23

MR. JARDINE:

In an emergency, we're able to deal with

24 I it immediately.
25 B

THE COURT:

Yeah, okay.

12

1

MR. J A R D I N E :

Further, we have agreed that within that

2 18-foot easement, Ward may also locate his utilities, one or
3 more of his utilities, if necessary, so long as the location
4 of them and their relationship to the existing waterline
5 meets all applicable regulations, ordinances, and codes.
6 And further, that if any of Ward's utilities will cross the
7 waterline, that Ward will provide, in advance of undertaking
8 any such utility construction, to provide Brighton
9

Corporation with its construction plans so that Brighton

10

Corporation may determine whether the proposed plans may

11

cause injury to Brighton Corporation's waterline.

12

We want to state on the record what we've advised Mr.

13

Parry—and I think he's agreeable—that it's recognized by

14

the parties that this is a unique waterline, that it's a

15

continuous, high-pressure, high-density, polyethylene line,

16

with special compaction and layering construction, and that

17

if it's crossed by any of—and also that it's sensitive to

18

temperature—and that if it's crossed by Ward, one of Ward's

19

utilities, that it will be completely restored to its

20

compaction and all of the necessary conditions for the

21

maintenance of the line, by Ward, and that—we want to state

22

on the record that, because it's susceptible to injury,

23

because it's a continuous line, a break and patch i6 not an

24

adequate solution for this kind of line, as opposed to other

25

kind6 of lines, so that great care needs to be taken with

13
1 (J respect to that, and so I think the fact that it would have
2 U to comply with all applicable regulations, ordinances, and
3 fj code, and we'd have a chance to review it in advance, would
4 I be satisfactory to us.

But it's a sensitive issue that I

5 (J just want to note for the record,
6 ||

I understand that if all of this is achieved and

7 I accomplished and finally resolved, that all other claims
8 | between the parties would be dismissed and that a final
9
10

order would be entered with the Court, setting forth all of
the terms of the settlement, attaching the plans, and that

11 | giving the parties, giving Brighton Corporation reasonable
12 I rights of inspection to ensure compliance in the
13 I construction phase with the plans the Court has approved.
14

And we can work—I'm just saying reasonable now, the

15 | details of which, but, I mean, we're talking about notice
16

and reasonable time and that sort of thing.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. JARDINE:

19

THE COURT:

20

All right,
I believe that states the agreementAll right.

Mr. Parry, you've heard the

agreement, do you concur?

2i

MR. PARRY:

22

MR. JARDINE:

23

MR. PARRY:

24

MR. JARDINE:

(Inaudible).
Well, I mentioned it.
Oh, did we you?

25 I three exceptions.

Okay.

Let me just be clear, because I cited the

14
l|

MR- PARRY:

2

MR. JARDINE:

3A

THE COURT:

4

record.

5

ft

That's r i g h t , t h a t ' s r i g h t -

Okay.

Okay.
Keep your discussions audible to the

MR- PARRY:

Yeah.

There are only two things, and one

6 I of them just came up this morning, and that's to have an
7 A architect sign.

My understanding is to have a certified

8 | engineer—that's the one who's going to really draw the site
9 A plan—and I wanted to make sure that was no problem—a
10ficertified engineer on the site plan.
11

MR. JARDINE:

12

MR. PARRY:

It's really not an architect's—you asked—

13 I

THE COURT:

It's not an architect's drawing, right?

14

MR. PARRY:

That's right.

15 |

MR. JARDINE:

16

fi

THE COURT:

And—

Can I just ask just this question?
Yes, certainly.

17 I

MR. JARDINE:

18

UNIDENTIFIED:

19

MR. JARDINE:

We—this hasn't been discussed.
(Inaudible).
Let me just clarify this.

Are you

20 II talking about the site plan, without a rendering of the
21 I cabin on it?
22

MR- SHAW:

No.

23 |

MR. JARDINE:

The cabin

(inaudible).

Don't we need, any t i m e t h e c a b i n ' s shown

24 B on the s i t e p l a n , t o a l s o have t h e — e x c u s e me—to a l s o have
25 I t h e a r c h i t e c t s i g n i t , 60 that h e ' s c e r t i f y i n g where t h e

15
1 II gr* d e elevations are?
2 ||

MR. SHAW:

That wouldn't be a problem,

3

MR- JARDINE:

4 I

MR. PARRY:

To have both?

Okay.

That's fine.

Your Honor, I don't know if you remember

5 II Mr- Kimball Shaw?
6
7

THE COURT:

Yes, I do remember.

I've known Kimball

Shaw a substantial period of his life.

8

MR. PARRY:

Oh.

g

THE COURT:

We also have been members of the Virginia

10 | Heights Tennis Club, where Mr. Shaw's father was somehow
11 1 invested with the presidency for about a third of his life,
12

but even there.

So, I—but I'm not personally acquainted

13

with Mr. Shaw, other than that.

I wouldn't describe it as

14 I social—it's casual.
15

MR. JARDINE:

Before you get to the calendar, I forget

1 6fit w o other things, Your Honor, in trying to rush this.
17fiof the issues is whether the road would be paved.

One

It's our

18

understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the

19

road, at Brighton Corporation's expense.

20

And we raised an issue, and it's one that we raised at

2i | the end, and there's some confusion about it.
22 K more to get clarification.

So, thi6 is

We think, at one point, a

23ficonditional use perroit was sought for thi6 building, which
24 | we understand, maybe correctly or incorrectly, would permit
25fiit to be a bed and breakfast, and we ju6t think you get a

16
1 permitted use permit, and we'd like to just be clear.
2
3

MR. PARRY:

I think that's one of the statements in the

letter.

4

MR. JARDINE:

5

MR. PARRY:

6

MR. JARDINE:

So you're fine on that?
So, we're (inaudible).

Yeah.

I mean, I don't think we're in

7 disagreement, because I don't think they intend to use
8 anything—than as a family cabin, but we just need to be
9 clear on that issue.
10
11
12
13
14

Having stated those then, we're back

to you.
THE COURT:

So you are clear on that, Mr. Parry, this

(inaudible)?
MR. PARRY:

Yes, that my understanding was the county

said, get a conditional use, a permitted use, you know,

15 that's fine to put a cabin up there.
16

THE COURT:

Okay.

There is no intent to use this at

17 any time—
18

MR. PARRY:

As a bed and breakfast?

19

THE COURT:

— a 6 a bed and breakfast?

20

MR. PARRY:

No, no.

21

THE C O U R T :

Okay.

22

MR. PARRY:

The only other thing—the only one thing

All right.

2-3 | was where you were talking about determining the waterline.
24
25

I just want it—made it clear to its prior condition.
THE COURT:

That's what they're expecting, ye6.

17
1 ||

MR. JARDINE:

2

MR. PARRY:

That's what I understand, yes.

Yeah.

It just was—it came out a little

Now, you can go ahead, Mr. Parry.

3 I differently.
4 II

THE COURT:

Okay.

5 I

MR. PARRY:

Oh, yes. My only other thing is the time

6

for trial, if necessary.

I'm hoping that you'll have two

7 | days sometime in late April or early May.
8 I

THE COURT:

Well, let's talk about—

9 |

MR. PARRY:

Hopefully, we won't need it, but—

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

Let's talk about that. Let me ask

11 I this—when would you be aware of whether you might want
12

those days?

How soon?

13

MR. PARRY:

Well—

14 A

THE COURT:

Right before the trial?

15

MR. PARRY:

Right before.

It's going to take about 30

16 | days, this is what we're—that gives us a little leeway, but
17 | 30 days to prepare the plans, to have an architect draw the
18 I plans.
19

Brighton has said that they would review them within

seven days.

What we're really up against is like a June 1st

20 § building permit date.

It takes about 30 days in the county.

21 | So f we would like to be able to get these to the county by
22 1 M a Y

1#t

'

June is when the building season starts, and we'd

23 | like to be ready to go by then.
24 |

THE COURT:

Okay,

25 A

MR. PARRY:

That's the only reason why I'm aekincr for-

18
1 some sooner date, but we don't want to go through another
2 building season.
3

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll tell you what I will do.

4 I'm anticipating whis to be a resolution of the case and,
5 certainly, if it isn't, it's going to be an inconvenience to
6 me, at that time, because in the interim I will have placed
7 other matters on my calendar.
8

MR. PARRY: Uh-huh.

9

THE COURT: And the only thing I will say now, why

10 don't we just set a date for one of those times, so that
11 we're all working upon the same page, but, hopefully, I
12 guess, we'll not have to use it. I would say probably we
d
13 ought to go to April 22" .

Is that convenient to both of

14 your calendars?
15

MR. PARRY: That'6 fine with mine.

16

MR. JARDINE: Give me just one second, Your Honor.

17

UNIDENTIFIED:

18

MR. JARDINE: Let me—I need to clarify something that

(Inaudible).

19 I probably misstated. The checklist that I understand that
20 Mr. Richardson and Mr. Shaw talked about, actually has some
21 steps along the way, as I understood it. That is, that
12

there are some things that you get before you get the final

23 set of plans. Now, maybe I'm misunderstanding it, but if
24 that's—that may or may not change the dates, but if we get
25 J all of that in 6even days, that—I'm being told that may not

19
1 II be adequate.
2

Is that a correct understanding of the

checklist?

3 Jl

MR- PARRY:

The way, as I understood it, that Neil

4 || Richardson had it, was that when he's working with a client,
5 | they do it in stages.
6 | accomplished.
7

Most of those stages have been

What needs to be done now is the final

drawings are drawn.

8

MR. JARDINE:

9

MR. PARRY:

Well, I'm not agreeing to the stages.

10

THE COURT:

What you're agreeing to is the final

11

All I'm—well, I (inaudible).

drawings will all be presented?

12

MR. PARRY:

That's correct.

13

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

14 I

MR. PARRY:

And it's, you know (inaudible).

15 1

UNIDENTIFIED:

16

MR. JARDINE:

(Inaudible).
I don't know what—I think—I would say

17 | this, Your Honor, they're a little concerned that my saying
18

if we get all the sets of plans at once, seven days may be

19

slightly ambitious.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. JARDINE:

22

Right.

That' s —

We could have like 14, and I'd like to be

honest with you, my client was just—had in mind—and I

23 | think, sort of fairly, that they would see the 6ite plan
24 H before they saw the final plan, which is sort of a staging
25 8 concept, but I 6aid to them, that's up to Mr. Ward/ and if

20
1

he wants to submit it all at once, there may be benefit in

2

submitting—

3

THE COURT:

Sure.

4

MR. JARDINE:

— o n e of those first, but that's his

5

call, not ours, but we will need maybe slightly more than

6

seven days to review it.

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

8

MR. PARRY:

The (inaudible) last night.

9

THE COURT:

That's not going to create any problem if

10

they're—if you have the plans within seven days from now.

11

MR. PARRY:

12

you to do them?

13

Well, I'm (inaudible).

MR. SHAW:

Oh, no, no, it'll—how long will it take

Well, the sub-plan would be the most

14

important drawing, and that's actually a good idea to submit

15

that as soon as possible and then continue (inaudible).

16

MR. PARRY:

Okay.

One of the things we discussed last

17

night, because we had the two architects together, was that

18

really this was not going to be a "let's just pack up and

19

leave each other and ignore each other for a month," but

20

that they could be working together and making sure things

21

are acceptable during this whole time period.

22

it as just dumping a set of plans on them in 30 days.

23
24

MR. JARDINE:

I don't see

I would say this, Your Honor, we're

willing to review plans along the way, like the site plan/

25 J when we get them, and we turn then around in a reasonable

21
1 || time frame, and if we could have—if that happens—
2 ||

THE COURT:

3 II

MR. JARDINE:

4

MR. PARRY:

That*s okay.

5

THE COURT:

On any plans that are submitted.

6

How about not les6 that 14 days?
From the time we get the plans?

Yes,

That

seems to be reasonable, and then don't just send them all at

7 Bonce, send them as soon as they're done.
8 |

MR. PARRY:

They'll certainly do that.

9

THE COURT:

Teah, okay.

10

MR. PARRY:

The 22nd and 23rd is okay with us, Your

All right.

11 Honor.
April 22nd and 23rd?

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JARDINE:

14 I

THE COURT:

Do you have a week later?

No, no, t h a t —

I have the 29th and 30th, but I have a

15 & three-day jury trial starting on Wednesday the 28th.
16

MR. PARRY:

Kr. Shaw said that he could get them done

17 A by the 7th, so that would give us 14 days.
18
19

I'll keep the 22nd or the 23rd, it was a

MR. JARDINE:
(inaudible).

Well, I can go to May 6th or 7th.

20 j

THE COURT:

21

MR. JARDINE:

I think they're worried about that

22 I bumping into the 30 days they think it takes to get to the
23 I county, 6 0 —
24 |

MR. PARRY:

And since—yes, we're the one6 who are

25 I asserting the pressure.

We111 put pressure on getting the

22
1 jj plans done.
2 I!

THE COURT:

Yeah.

I might say, you've asserted

3 | pressure for about three years, and you haven't been a part
4 I of it, but I'm not any longer sensitive to your pressure on
5

that, in that respect, because I've had enough of it.

So—

6

MR. PARRY:

I was hoping that we wouldn't get into—

7

THE COURT:

Yeah.

8

MR. PARRY:

—those types of things.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

MR. JARDINE:

11 j

THE COURT:

12

Let me a6k, Your Honor, we have—

Well, here's the problem.

day jury trial set on the 28th, right now.

I have a threeIt's a "96 case,

13 I I don't know anything more than its number—I except it will

14 1 go.
15

MR. PARRY:

We said we'd meet the 22nd, we'd meet that

16 1 day.
17
18

MR. JARDINE:
Hagen.

I'm just getting a conflict here from Mr,

I would—

19

THE COURT:

That you have?

20

MR- JARDINE:

No, that we have for the 22nd.

If there

21 J was a chance we could—if you could—if we could call back
22

and call the lawyers on that three-day trial and, if it

23 I looks like it has a chance of settling, have the 29th and
24 1 30 th as a—
25 I

THE COURT:

I'll

g i v e y o u t h e 29 t h and 30 t h r i g h t

now—

23
1 (( it's just that I may have to deal with it.
2 ||

MR- JARDINE:

I understand, Your Honor.

I'm sorry,

3 || it's a conflict with my client.
4 ||

THE COURT:

5 ||

MR. JARDINE:

6

Okay.
So, if we could hold that and we'll find

out from Taunie who the (inaudible).

7

THE COURT:

Well, don't worry about that right now.

8 J don't want that.

I mean, let them settle their own case.

9

All right.

MR. JARDINE:

10
11

THE COURT:
tr

I

Your number is 94 anyway, so I would normal

Y it ahead of another one, except that this has been moved

12

so many times, I may not have quite the sympathy that I

13

might have had previously, and I don € t mean to be unkind

14

about that.

15

MR. PARRY:

All right.

16

THE COURT:

Because I have now three days that are just

17

given back to me, and I don't have another case in those

18

three days, which is not very happy—you know, even though I

19

might have other things to do, I do have plenty to do, but

20

it's not a very happy thing to save those days for you and

21 U gotten the other cases cleared out.
22
23

that respect.
Have you stated your stipulation to your satisfaction/

24 I Mr. Jardine?
25

Okay, that's enough,

MR. JARDINE:

I have.

m

24

1 II

THE COURT:

Mr, Parry, do you concur?

2

MR- PARRY:

Yes.

3

THE COURT:

All right.

Let's have—who, on behalf of

4 I Brighton Corporation, should be placed under oath?
5

MR. JARDINE:

6

THE COURT:

7

right hand, please?

8

and raise your right hand, please?

9 |

Mrs. Barton.

All right.

COURT CLERK:

Will you stand and raise your

And, Mr- Ward, will you likewise stand

Do you and each of you solemnly swear the

10

testimony you're about to give in the case before the Court

11

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

12

truth, so help you God?

13

MRS. BARTON:

14 J

MR. WARD:

15

THE COURT:

Yes.

Yes.
All right.

You€ve heard the statement of

16 I the stipulation by your attorney and also by Mr. Parry.

Do

17 I y ° u agree to the terms and conditions of this stipulation
18

and agree to implement them?

19

MRS. BARTON:

20

THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

Likewise, you've heard the

21 I statement of the stipulation now concurred and by all,
22 | including Brighton Corporation.

Do you agree to the terms

23 I and conditions, of the stipulation and to implement them,
24 I Mr. Ward?
25 I

****•• WARD:

Yes, yes.

25
THE COURT:

Thank you each-

All right, based then upon

that stipulation, the Court will strike the trial date
anticipating, hopefully, that the whole matter will be
resolved upon this stipulation-

The Court has continued a

trial date, in anticipation that the matter will be
resolved, however, to April 29th and 30th, if needed, for the
trial.

All right?

MR- JARDINE:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Tour Honor-

Thank you each for your appearances.

Court's in recess-
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October 28, 1998

Brent D Ward, Esq
PARRY LAWRENCE & WARD
60 E South Temple, #1270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re

Brighton Corporation v Ward

Dear Brent
As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation of last week, Brighton Corporation has
decided to make one last effort to resolve the ongoing dispute before proceeding to motions1 and trial in
this case I will not repeat all of the issues that have built up and which are set out in prior letters,
except to note that the recent discovery by Brighton Corporation that since April 1996 Mr Ward has
been seeking approval from Salt Lake County Development Services not only for the Chalet Plan but
also for the Designer and Cottage Plans, all of which are now on file at the County, has added to the
skepticism of my clients
On behalf of Brighton Corporation, we offer to resolve all issues and approve the Chalet Plan on
the following principles

1

As I have indicated, and so there is no question, by proceeding with this proposal Bnghton Corporation is not abandoning or waiving
in any way its position that it is entitled to have Mr Ward either have the plans signed and verified by an architect or reimburse
Bnghton Corporation for its expenses and professional fees in reviewing further plans If we fail to reach agreement, then we will
proceed to file our motion for partial summary jdugment that requiring verification by an architect and reimburement of reviewing
expenses is reasonable. We are also considering including as a ground for that motion that consideration of the standards of the
Foothill Canyons Overlay Zone is reasonable

" PUlNTIF£SEXHIBr
EXHIBIT NO
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Brent D.Ward, Esq.
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1.
We wish to resolve aH issues that now or may exist between these parties, so that to the
fullest extent possible there is noriskof future litigation between them except with respect to
compliance with the Court's Orders There should be no ambiguities or open issues in the final
resolution.
2.
Any settlement must be fully and completely documented and incorporated in an order of
the Court that includes all approved plans, with continuing jurisdiction in the Court to monitor
compliance with the order and with a reasonablerightin Brighton Corporation to inspect for
compliance.
In proposing this resolution, Brighton Corporation has considered and re-examined only the
Chalet plans of June 3, 1998. Based on those plans, Brighton Corporation would give its approval and
resolve this entire issue only if the following changes were made or conditions were met (most or all of
which are not new). Brighton Corporation has highlighted points on the maps and site plans, copies of
which are included, which must be removed, as well as inconsistencies in the plans that must be
corrected
1

FRONT PORCH ON NORTH

We have repeatedly asked for detailed drawings of how Mr. Ward proposed to accomplish the
design and placement of a porch on the north side of the cabin, as Brighton Corporation has been
skeptical that it could be done. To date we have not received the requested detailed drawings.
We do not believe that the entire north side of the cabin can be graded down to the 116'
elevation shown on the topography map, so that thefloorof the porch and the steps leading up to the
porch can be placed lower than the first floor of the cabin, which has been agreed upon and set at 116'
10." Cutting the mountainside down as much asfivefeet, then trying to hold it with a retaining wall on
the east and grading awayfromthe north side of the porch is not feasible. This is not placing the cabin
into the slope of the mountain, but rather cutting down the mountain to fit in a porch. This is also
important because of the very real potential impact on Brighton Corporation's waterline.
Brighton Corporation has suggested that the cabin be entered from the east side of the cabin into
the second floor, which, particularly in the winter, would provide an easy access to the cabinfromthe
circular driveway and parking, orfromthe patio on the west side of the cabin.
2.

BRIGHTON CORPORATIONS WATERLINE AND EASEMENT

The existence and present location of Brighton Corporation's waterline and easement must be
confirmed so there is no future dispute about it.
Brighton Corporation's waterline has never been moved, only lowered into the ground, and
extended by Silver Lake Company to reach their new main line. Mr. Ward has shown Brighton

Brent D. Ward, Esq.
October 28, 1998
Page 3
Corporation's waterline in several different locations on different maps and site plans, none correctly
Given these issues, Sneidman and Assoc, with the help of Steve Jorgenson, Silver Lake Company
watermaster, prepared a survey in June 1994. As part of the resolution, the parties must agree on the
accuracy of that survey, and Mr. Ward will remove any notations from any plans he has submitted or
will submit to the County or other agencies questioning in any way therightor location of that
easement. The notations made by Kirk Morgan of Sneidman & Assoc, and Steve Jorgenson,
watermaster, are the only notes concerning Brighton Corporation's waterline that may appear on any
site plan included withfinalplans.
Finally, the proposed waterline to Mr. Ward's cabin must be located further south than Brighton
Corporation's valve connection to the Silver Lake line. Mr. Ward must document the exact location of
his waterline and valve, as directed or approved by Mr. Jorgenson.
3.

WARD/COATS SEWER LINE

The words, "Brighton Corporation disputed sewer line placed Aug 1997 outside provided
easement" is to be removed from all site plans. Brighton Corporation's sewer line was placed by
Solitude Improvement District within the easement as shown on "Grant of Easement for Construction
and Maintenance" dated May 6, 1994
No provision was made in the Special Warranty Deed or Property Use Agreement for
Ward/Coats utilities to be placed in theright-of-wayrunning along Forest Alley (vacated). Dransfield's
utilities are located in the north side of the easement, Brighton Corporation's sewer line on the south
side, and the center portion is for utilities that will be installed on the property between Dransfield's and
Brighton Corporation's at some future time.
Mr. Ward's sewer line should be shown on site plans running along the west end of his property
from the cabin to the main sewer connection on Prospect Ave. It thus would run beneath Brighton
Corporation's waterline at one point only, and that should be at the west end of Brighton Corporation's
waterline
Mr. Ward will need to provide Brighton Corporation with a "Grant of Easement for
Construction and Maintenance" issued by Solitude Improvement District to him, showing the exact
location of his sewer line.
4.

PATIO

In reviewing the proposed patio in the June 3, 1998 plans, Brighton Corporation understands the
proposal to include a very substantial excavation of the ground on the south to accommodate the
proposed patio. Brighton Corporation cannot approve such a disturbance to the land.
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Brighton Corporation does not approve 758 square feet of concrete, or almost 2/3 the size of
the entire cabin, for a patio as proposed in your letter of June 3, 1998. Although the Special Warranty
Deed specifically calls for decking, in the meeting of January 1997 in Neil Richardson's office, Brighton
Corporation agreed to allow Greg to use a concrete patio rather than wood decking if the area on the
south was cut down approximately one-third. That was discussed by the architects in order to avoid a
deep cut of over eight feet in the mountain. Greg has not complied with his part of the agreement.
The patio on the south of the cabin may be 25 X 12 feet, or 300 square feet. This would
necessitate only a 4-5 foot high retaining wall, without grading the ground in any significant way,
instead of an 8-9 foot high retaining wall. This amount would be in addition to the concrete patio on
the west of the cabin which is shown as 29 feet X 10 feet, or 290 square feet. This is a total of 590
square feet of cement patio, or half again the square footage of the cabin, plus 48 square feet of decking
off the second floor.
5.

PARKING

The site plan shows two proposed areas for parking located east of the circular driveway with
the inaccurate note "existing parking." The proposed parking is located in the Buffer Zone, which may
not be used for parking, as outlined in the Property Use Agreement. Parking must be on or west of the
circular driveway
6.

SET OF EXTERIOR ELEVATION DRAWINGS AND ELEVATIONS

Drawings of the front, rear, and both sides of the chalet cabin showing the relationship of the
cabin to the existing topography of the land must be submitted to Brighton Corporation. These
drawings are to be the same type of drawings that have been submitted with other plans delivered to
Brighton Corporation in December 1993, March 1994, July 1995 and August 1995. We have not
received the exterior elevation drawings with any of the Chalet plans, though we have asked for them
several times.
The drawings of the contour of the land should, of course, be the same as previous elevation
drawings made by Kimble Shaw, but the position of the cabin will be different as the Chalet is built into
the slope of the mountain with the upper surface of thefirstfloor at 116' 10", and with no basement.
As a result, the drawings will show the southeast corner of the upper surface of the first floor 7-8
feet into the ground, the northeast corner 4-5 feet into the ground, with as little disturbance to the
existing grade as possible. This would be in addition to the footings and crawl space which are under
the first floor. We have agreed that the ceiling of the first floor of the cabin may be 9 feet in height if
the first floor of the cabin is built on grade on the west and into the slope of the mountain.

Brent D. Ward, Esq.
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7.

TOPOGRAPHY MAP AND SURVEY

As part of any final set of plans, Mr. Ward must include a copy of the original Francom
Topography Map showing the 2' contour intervals across the south side of the property. As Francom
did not include Brighton Corporation's waterline on the topography map, Mr. Ward should include the
transparent copy of the Sneidman Survey in the exact scale as the topography map showing the
relationship of Brighton Corporation's waterline, the circular driveway, buffer zone, and present parking
area, which can be superimposed onto the topography map.
A footprint of the cabin and patio should be drawn on the map using a dotted line or another
method that does not obscure the contour lines on the map.
8.

ROADWAY

As previously discussed, as part of the resolution, the legal description of the road should be
changed to match the physical location of the road maintaining the 20' width. In addition, Brighton
Corporation may proceed to asphalt the road for safety and emergency vehicle access.
9

ADDITIONAL ITEMS

a.
There needs to be a clear definition of the meaning of the phrase, "construction grade
116", which appears at numerous places in the plans. This is ambiguous.
b.
All necessary corrections should be made to Techni-Graphic Services sheets 1-5 for front
porch, retaining walls, patio, doorways, etc. On sheet 5, the elevation of the patio should be given with
the other elevations, and the height of the crawl space should be given as "36" maximum," instead of
"36" min."
c.
Several corrections need to be made to the General Notes which are included as the last
page of the plans.
(i)
The words "which is to be no higher than 36" should be added to #13, which
refers to the crawl space.
(ii)
#37 reads: "Smoke detectors required at each bedroom, at hallways leading to
bedrooms, at every floor level, at the top of each stairway on any floor without bedrooms, and
in rooms serving bedrooms where the ceiling height of the room is 24" or more greater in height
than the bedroom served from such room." As the cabin is to have only two floors with no loft
or basement, and as your plans show one set of stairs and bedrooms on the 2nd floor only, this
note is ambiguous and should be corrected.
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(iii) OTHER reads: 4CNo stumps, roots or vegetation shall be removed from the soil
of B/C's waterline easement except as may be necessary for placement of utilities, water and
sewer." The word 'organic material' should be added after the word "vegetation", and the
words "except as may be necessary for placement of utilities, water and sewer" must be omitted.
d.
Brighton Corporation was not given a copy of the "Support Documents for Gregory M.
Ward Cabin", which are attached to the Chalet Plans at Salt Lake County Development Services. Mr.
Ward will need to correct each page of this document to bring it into conformity, and submit a copy to
Brighton Corporation for approval.
The first page, which is Mr. Ward's letter of August 18, 1998 to Development Services for
Planning and Zoning, notes that he is enclosing (12) site plans showing electrical-water-sewer service
on the property. At the present time there is no electrical, water, or sewer services on the property.
This needs to be corrected or explained.
The August 18 letter also indicates that he is enclosing two copies of the building plan
elevations. We think these must have been the copies of the Cottage Plan elevations which we found in
the file with the Chalet plans. The two sets of plans are not interchangeable for Brighton Corporation's
review.
In that letter, Greg also includes three maps to show "Drainage," "Course of Construction
Fencing," and "Area of Ground Disturbance/Grading." Parking is shown in the two areas of the buffer
zone. The position of the sewer line and water lines need to be corrected. Construction fencing must
run the entire west side of the buffer zone and must run along the south side of Brighton Corporation's
waterline easement except where the easement is across the circular driveway. The enclosed map
showing ground disturbance/grading is highlighted in yellow showing those areas where there may not
be any grading and which must experience as little disturbance as possible.
It also appears that a "color board for exteriorfinish"was included with the Support Document
subnriitted to the County August 18, 1998. Mr. Ward has not given Brighton Corporation this material,
but as this is a part of the design of the cabin, this also needs to be submitted for approval to Brighton
Corporation. In the past, we have indicated that this will likely not be an issue for Brighton
Corporation.
CONCLUSION
All of the drawings and documents requested must be furnished. Each item noted as incorrect
must be remedied as outlined. All additions, deletions, and adjustments must be addressed and
incorporated into a complete and truthful set of plans. After Mr. Ward has made the necessary
corrections, Neil Richardson will be asked to verify them for accuracy. If approved we will prepare a
settlement agreement based on the plans. Once the Court has entered an Order, Mr. Ward may then
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submit those Court-approved plans to Salt Lake County Development Services for a building permit in
place of the three plans, which are now on file there.
If the plans are not corrected in every detail as we have suggested, and all drawings and
documents are not submitted as requested, approval cannot be given.
We hope this proposal will result in a resolution. Given the history, Brighton Corporation does
not want to negotiate these points. However, I certainly am willing to clarify any aspect of this letter.
We look forward to hearingfromyou.
Very truly yours,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

A~Wames S. Jardine
cc
433379

Sam Clark
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February 22, 1999

Douglas J Parry, Esq.
PARRY, LAWRENCE & WARD
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Brighton Corporation v. Ward

Dear Doug:
I am writing on behalf of Brighton Corporation in response to your letter of February 5,
1999, and with respect to the plans that accompanied that letter. I also acknowledge our
subsequent receipt of two additional drawings last week that you advised me are "corrected"
drawings prepared by Kimble Shaw. Additionally, on February 18, 1999, we received an
additional 13 (thirteen) pages of plans that we understand are a duplicate of the plans already
provided on February 5, with red dots marking your ameliorative changes, along with an
accompanying letter of explanation. Brighton Corporation has carefully reviewed the plans
signed by Kimble Shaw and consulted with Neil Richardson, a licensed architect, and has
directed me to respond on its behalf. For the reasons set out below, Brighton Corporation does
not approve these plans.
1.
The Plans are Incomplete and Lack Necessary Detail. The plans do not comply
with the Court's grant of Brighton Corporation's recent motion for partial summary judgment.
The Court's order provides that Brighton Corporation may require, as a condition of further
review, that the plans be signed by a licensed architect. The plans Brighton Corporation received
include only three drawings signed by Kimble Shaw and those three drawings contain little of
^PUUNTI^«XHIBI
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the detail Brighton Corporation needs to remove the ambiguity from the plans. Although you
have objected that there is not enough time for Shaw to prepare a complete set of plans, this
requirement was first imposed in a letter dated June 10, 1998, and was verbally requested long
before then. In fact, it was initially suggested by Judge Young approximately one year ago.
The plans that were prepared and signed by Kimble Shaw are not sufficiently detailed for
Brighton Corporation to determine whether they are acceptable. For example, Brighton
Corporation has consistently requested that Ward provide a site plan with contour lines that are
clearly labeled with correct elevations. The site plan should include the exact elevation of each
outside corner of the structure (including the base of retaining walls and footings). Elevation
drawings must also include exact elevations for each outside corner. Moreover, the elevation
drawings must include the architect's rendering of how the building fits into the existing grade
on all four sides. The heavy black line on the elevations signed by Shaw is insufficiently
detailed for Brighton to make its determination. The original plans considered by the Court in
September 1994 showed how the cabin would fit into the existing landscape. These elevations
do not include that detail and for those reasons, among others, the submitted plans are
unacceptable.
2.
The Plans do not Adequately Clarify the North Porch. The plans do not show
how a porch and the main entrance can be placed on the north side of the building without an
excessive cut in the mountain and disturbance to Brighton Corporation's wateriine and wateriine
easement. This issue is complicated by Ward's failure to submit plans that are sufficiently
detailed. The lack of contour lines and exact elevations, as well as the failure to include a
drawing showing how the porch and entryway fit into existing grade, makes it impossible for
Brighton Corporation to determine whether the structure will disturb its wateriine. This issue has
been discussed in several letters in the past. It is critical that Kimble Shaw address this issue
with a detailed and specific drawing.
Brighton Corporation continues to believe that the entrance should be moved to the east
side of the cabin at the second floor level or to the patio on the west side. Either option avoids
the difficulties caused by trying to force a north-side entrance.
3.
The Patio on the South Side may require an Excessive Cut. The patio on the
south and west sides of the cabin is too large and may require an excessive cut in the mountain.
Brighton Corporation does not approve 758 square feet of concrete, or almost 2/3 the size of the
entire cabin, for a patio as stated in your plans. The Special Warranty Deed calls for decking,
not a concrete patio. In January 1997, the architects discussed reducing the size of the patio by
one-third in the southeast corner in order to reduce the size of the retaining wall that would be
required in the southeast corner. The plans ignore this consensus. Moreover, Kimble Shaw's
drawings do not address the patio in any detail. As with the porch on the north side, this
prevents Brighton Corporation from being able to determine whether the cut in the mountain is
excessive. A retaining wall of more than six feet would violate the standards set out in the
Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone. Brighton Corporation suggests now, as it has in the past,
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that the patio on the south be reduced from 39 x 12 to 25 x 12, which would necessitate a much
smaller cut in the mountain and still provide for a very sizeable patio In the alternative, the
patio could be stepped down as it runs west along the south side of the cabin
As Brighton Corporation has indicated many times, detailed and complete plans signed
by an architect are necessary to avoid any further disputes should acceptable plans ultimately be
approved by Brighton Corporation Such plans would then be available for inclusion in a court
order and for clear and objective compliance and enforcement thereof.
Brighton Corporation did not review all of the drawings submitted In keeping with our
prior motion and the Court's direction, Brighton reviewed only those drawings signed by Mr.
Shaw. For the reasons stated above, those drawings are not acceptable to Brighton Corporation.
Very truly yours,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

V^
cc
451275

Brighton Corporation

James S Jardine
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Buildine Information
General Contractor
Name
Phone *
License #
Insurance Carriers
LiabihtA
I
Worker's Compensation
2
Job Foreman's Name
Home Phone
Cell Phone
Job Phone
Job FAX
Mechanical Contractor
Name
Phone #
License U
Insurance Carriers
I
Liability
Worker's Compensauon
2.
Plumbing Contractor
Name
Phone #
License U
Insurance Carriers
Liability
1
Worker's Compensation
2
Electrician
Name
Phone #
License #
Insurance Camera
1
Liability
2
Worker's Compensauon
Landscaper
Name
Phone H
License M
Insurance Camera
1
Liability
2
Worker's Compensauon
Deer Crest Builder Guidelines & Requirements

Submitted

Not Submitted

1
2
3
4
5

D

D

D
D
D
D

•
•D

Site Access
Staging
Fire/Saiety
Quality Assurance
Deer Crest Requirements During Construction

D

During construcUon the owner shall cause his Builder to conform to the following
•
Builder shall satisfy all requirements ot Wasatch County Mumcipal Code and those requirements
ot the applicable governmental and private agencies for the hook-up ot water, power and any
temporary use ot such services
•
Portable chemical toilet laciliUes and construcUon trash containers must be in place on the site, at
an approved locaUon, at the time construction work is commenced These tacihues shall be
regularly emptied and serviced at not less than twice weekly mtervals Such facilities must be
removed when construcUon is completed, or li construcUon is halted for more man 30 davs
•
No construction work mav start betore 7 00 a m or continue after 7 00 p m No construction
work is to be allowed on Sundays or on naUonally recognized legal holidays
Page 2 of 3

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
10

All noise abatement laws of Wasatch Countv or the DRC will be adhered to during construction
All deliveries, loadmg/unloadmg and hauling will conform to the hours ol operation between
7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m
All hauling routes and load protections required under Wasatch Countv Municipal Code will be
strictly adhered to and monitored bv the construction site superintendent
Construction site vehicles, equipment and employee vehicles will park within the construction
site
No loose dogs or anv other pets of workers are permitted on site
Litter and trash on site must be controlled and properly disposed ol
The construction site should be securelv lenced and maintained in conformance with Wasatch
Countv Municipal Code, so as not impact the adjacent area*

Survev Certification bv Builder of Actual Construction

Submitted

Not Submitted

O

G

Surveyor
Name
License #
Letter ot Certiiication
11

Copv ot Anv Red Tags by Municipality

Q

Q

12

Final Inspection

Q

Q
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Exhibit G

JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647)
ROBERT P. HILL (A1492)
SCOTT A. HAGEN (A4840)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South Main Street, Suite 400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
—ooOoo—
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION
FOR DETERMINATION THAT
CONSENT HAS BEEN
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD

Plaintiff,
v.
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M.
COATS, individually and as Trustees of
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December
10, 1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an
individual, DOUG'S TREE SERVICE,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
UNKNOWN PERSONS designated as
JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10,
Defendants.

:

Civil No. 940905453
:
Judge David S. Young
:
:

—ooOoo—
This matter came before the Court for hearing on July 13, 1995. At issue was
defendant Gregory Ward's ("Ward") Application for Determination that Consent Has Been
Unreasonably Withheld ("Application"). James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as

00467

counsel for Brighton Corporation. David M. Connors appeared as counsel for Ward. Prior
to the hearing, the Court received and reviewed Ward's Application and memorandum in
support (along with exhibits), plaintiffs memorandum in opposition, and Ward's reply
memorandum in support. At the hearing, the Court heard testimony from Ward and from
Neil Richardson, plaintiffs architect.
Based on the papers submitted by counsel and the testimony and exhibits presented at
the hearing, the Court finds that the plans submitted by Ward for approval by Brighton
Corporation do not adequately comply with the restrictive covenants of the special warranty
deed or this court's previous order granting preliminary injunction. The Court therefore
concludes that Brighton Corporation did not act unreasonably in rejecting the plans.
Accordingly, the Court denies Ward's Application for Determination that Consent Has
Been Unreasonably Withheld.
DATED this

of August, 1995.
BY TfflrCOURT:

Hondrable David^^oung
Distrid^ot

0134524.01

004R7A

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
DENYING APPUCATION FOR DETERMINATION THAT CONSENT HAS BEEN
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD was hand-delivered on this _£f/day of August, 1995 to
the following:
David M. Connors
Kenneth J. Sheppard
Kevin C. Marcoux
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE
136 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

A^fbt

Qj.Hnf^.

0134524.01

(" 46?fi

Exhibit H

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

: COURT%S RULING

BRIGHTON CORP.,
Plaintiff,

: CASE NO. 940905453

vs.

:

ISABEL M. COATS,

:

Defendant.

:

The above-entitled matter was referred by the assigned Judge
to

the

Presiding

Judge,

after

the

former

denied

recusal,

determining that petitioner's affidavit of bias and prejudice was
legally insufficient. This referral has been handled in accordance
with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 63(b) governs
mandatory disqualification and does not relate to discretionary
recusal by the challenged judge.
1091, 1094-95 (Utah 1988).

See, State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d

The Utah Supreme Court: has interpreted

the corresponding rule of criminal procedure, Rule 29, to require
a showing of actual bias before disqualification is mandated. Id. ;
see also. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925-26 (Utah App. 1990).
Consequently, petitioner's affidavit of bias and prejudice must
establish actual bias before disqualification of the assigned judge
is required.

00718

BRIGHTON V. COATS

PAGE FOUR

COURT'S RULING

The Affidavit herein alleges that the affiant "believes" the
assigned Judge may be biased because opposing counsel (and other
members of his firm) were listed along with some 75-100 other
individuals in a pre-election ad (from the fall of 1996) supporting
the retention of the assigned Judge. A mere conclusory opinion or
belief that the assigned judge is or may be biased is insufficient
for recusal, unless the belief is based on facts demonstrating bias
in fact.
Affiant has not stated, in the Affidavit or in accompanying
Motion to Recuse or Memorandum in Support, any facts supportive of
actual bias. An unsupported "concern about possible impartiality"
is legally insufficient for a recusal.
Additionally, Rule 63(b) requires that an affidavit ". . .be
filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or
such bias or prejudice is known."

It would appear that petitioner

knew of the circumstances underlying this claim of alleged bias, in
October or early November of 1996, and has done nothing until the
Motion was filed on May 16, 1997. This significant delay is noted
and appears inconsistent with a sincerely held belief in the
existence of either actual bias or the appearance of bias or
impropriety.

00719

BRIGHTON V. COATS

PAGE THREE

COURT'S RULING

For the foregoing reasons recusal is denied. This matter is
referred back to the assigned judge for further proceedings and
disposition.

LESLIE A. LEWIS
PRESIDING JUDGE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

00720

PAGE FOUR

BRIGHTON V. COATS

COURT'S RULING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Court's

Ruling,

to

the following, this

day of

, 1997:

James S. Jardine
Attorney for Plaintiff
79 S. Main, Suite 400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
David M. Connors
Attorney for Defendant
136 s. Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Exhibit I

WAR a 2 ;::2
James S. Jardine (A1647)
Scott A. Hagen (A4840)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main, #500
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
(801)532-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

^f COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
—ooOoo—
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
ISABEL M COATS and WALTER M
COATS, individually and as Trustees of the
Isabel M Coats Trust dated December 10,
1985, GREGORY M WARD, an individual,
DOUG'S TREE SERVICE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and UNKNOWN PERSONS
designated as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10,

Civil No. 940905453
Judge David S. Young

Defendants
—ooOoo—
Plaintiff Brighton Corporation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on for
hearing at 8:30 a.m on January 22, 1999 before the Honorable David S. Young. James S.
Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as counsel for plaintiff Brighton Corporation. Douglas J.

ons

Parry appeared as counsel for defendant Gregory M Ward Having reviewed the legal
memoranda, including exhibits, submitted by counsel for both parties, having heard oral
argument from counsel, and deeming itself fully advised in the premises,
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Brighton Corporation's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment is GRANTED as follows
1.

It is reasonable for Brighton Corporation, as a condition of reviewing future

proposed plans submitted by defendant Ward, to require reimbursement of legal and professional
fees and costs incurred as part of that review However, Mr Ward may challenge the
reasonableness of such fees and costs at trial If it is found at trial that the amount charged and
paid is reasonable, then Brighton Corporation may keep the fees and costs paid
2

It is reasonable for Brighton Corporation, as a condition of reviewing any plans

from Mr Ward, to require that the plans be signed by a licensed architect
3

In reviewing plans submitted by Mr Ward, it is reasonable for Brighton

Corporation to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") of Salt Lake
County to Ward's proposed plans for comparison However, to the extent FCOZ contains a oneacre minimum lot size, the parties have stipulated that the provision shall not apply At trial,
Mr Ward may challenge the reasonableness of specific provisions of FCOZ applied by Brighton
in reviewing the plans
DATED this 3

day of Eebw«7^999

2

n

y^

BY THE COURT:

Hon. Davi
District
Approved as to Form

Douglas J. Parry

01187

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered on this ^^~

day of

February, 1999 to the following:
Douglas J. Parry
PARRY, LAWRENCE & WARD
60 East South Temple, #1270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^ 7 I"

• •"., V

nf,-'\r>K

447151
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Exhibit J

Douglas J. Parry, Esq. (#2531)
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434
Attorneys for Defendant Gregory M. Ward
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M.
COATS, individually and as Trustees of
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December
10, 1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an
individual, DOUG'S TREE SERVICE,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
UNKNOWN PERSONS designated as
JOHN DOES NO. 1 through 10,

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS J. PARRY
IN SUPPORT OF GREGORY M.
WARD'S PETITION FOR
EMERGENCY EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT DIRECTED TO JUDGE DAVID
S. YOUNG, THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
STATE OF UTAH

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

}

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

}

I, Douglas J. Parry, state under oath as follows:
1.

1 am over the age of 18, am legal counsel for the Defendant Gregory

M. Ward in Case No. 940905453, currently pending before Judge David S. Young in the

Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have personal knowledge of
the matters set forth below.
2.

On December 22, 1998, I was served with a motion for partial

summary judgment filed by the plaintiff in this action. In that motion, the plaintiff requested
the Court to rule as a matter of law on the following three issues:
(i)

That Greg Ward must compensate Brighton for all further costs

associated with any review by Brighton of any plans submitted by Greg Ward, including
attorney's fees incurred by Brighton.
(ii)

That any plans submitted by Greg Ward be approved by a

(iii)

That Brighton could consider the Foothills and Canyons Overlay

licensed architect.

Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") in reviewing any plans submitted by Greg Ward.
None of these restrictions or requirements are contained in the Special
Warranty Deed or Property Use Agreement.
3.

On December 23, 1998, the day after the plaintiffs motion for

summary judgment was filed, the Court held a scheduling conference. I attended that
scheduling conference on behalf of the defendant Greg Ward. At the scheduling conference,
the plaintiff advised the Court of the motion for partial summary judgment that had been
filed the day earlier. The Court had not yet reviewed the motion, and I had not yet had any
opportunity to oppose the motion. Nevertheless, the Court informed counsel for both parties
that the Court was inclined to grant the motion for partial summary judgment.
2

4.

I objected to the Court's comments, stating that I had just been served

with the motion and would like the opportunity to address the motion before the Court made
a decision concerning the motion. The Court responded by telling me that I could go ahead
and file an opposition, but that the Court was nevertheless inclined to grant the motion. It
was clear from the Court's statements to me that the Court had decided at that point to grant
the motion for partial summary judgment and that any opposition that I might file would be
futile.
5.

I filed an opposition to the motion and a hearing on the motion was

held on January 22, 1999. The Court granted the motion for partial summary judgment
during the January 22, 1999 hearing.
6.

As a result of the partial summary judgment, the Defendant Greg Ward

is required to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs of plaintiffs architect's review of
any plans that Ward submits for the construction of his cabin. On July 28, 1999, counsel for
Brighton Corporation submitted a bill to Ward in the amount of $5,446.50 for Brighton's
counsel's review of plans submitted by Ward. A copy of this bill is attached hereto.
7.

In addition, the Court is requiring Ward to incur the additional expense

of having a licensed architect sign any plans submitted by Ward, which in turn required that
Ward pay a licensed architect to redraft the plans already submitted so that the architect's
signature could be attached.
8.

There is no requirement in the Special Warranty Deed that Ward pay

any fees and costs associated with Brighton's review of plans. There is no requirement in

3

the Special Warranty Deed that plans submitted by Ward be drawn and signed by a licensed
architect. The imposition of these requirement by the Court makes it difficult for Ward to
submit plans to Brighton as a result of the excessive costs created by the Court's order.
9.

I attended another scheduling conference held in this case on September

10.

At the time of the scheduling conference, I was not aware that a few

8, 1999.

days earlier the plaintiff had filed a motion for an order allowing pavement of the roadway
across the defendant's property in contravention of the express terms of the Property Use
Agreement between the parties which requires that the road remain gravel.
11.

At the scheduling conference, the plaintiff informed the Court that it

had filed the motion a few days earlier. The Court granted the motion for an order allowing
pavement of the roadway over my objection and despite the fact that the defendant had not
had notice or an opportunity to be heard on the matter.
12.

I did not receive the motion until after the scheduling conference. The

certificate of service accompanying the motion claims that the motion was served by mail on
Friday, September 3, 1999. Because Monday, September 6, 1999 was Labor Day, there was
no mail service on that day, meaning that it would have been impossible for the motion to
reach my office until September 7 or 8, 1999.
13.

The plaintiff filed a proposed order allowing the pavement of the

roadway. I filed timely objections to the proposed order, including an objection that Mr.
Ward's right to due process was violated by the Court's granting the motion without
4

providing Mr. Ward any notice or any opportunity to be heard. The Court denied my
objections and entered the order on September 21, 1999.
14.

Plaintiffs counsel recently telephoned me to request permission for the

plaintiff to cut down a tree on the defendant's property associated with the pavement of the
roadway. I informed plaintiffs counsel that the defendant did not agree to the request and
would not allow any trees on his property to be cut down.
DATED this J£_ day of September, 1999.

DOUGL^^PA^T

SUBSCRIBED, ACKNOWLEDGED AND SWORN TO before me this 3d><&
day of September, 1999.

\ £ § M
|^^**W

^ ^ a ^ f t ^ '
7

January 22.2000

NOTARY PUBLIC
|

5

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
for

BRIGHTON CORPORATION
c/o MARY BARTON
2661 ST. MARY'S WAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84108

Greg Ward
c/o Douglas Parry
PARRY, ANDERSON & MANSFIELD

1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

02/08/99

Draft and revise letter to D Parry, review plans
received from same, meeting with J S Jardine,
meeting with M Barton regarding plans, telephone
conference with S Clark regarding plans, letter to D
Parry

S Hagen

3 00

450 00

02/11/99

Review letter from D Parry, revise and send letter
from J S Jardine to Parry

S Hagen

50

75 00

02/12/99

Review new plans, meet with M Barton, read
materials received from M Barton

S Hagen

3 00

450.00

02/17/99

Review plans, draft rejection letter to D Parry,
conference with M Barton

S Hagen

3 00

450 00

02/18/99

Telephone conference with D Parry regarding
issues for trial and additional plans

S Hagen

20

30 00

02/19/99

Meeting with N Rjchardson and clients, revise letter
to D Parry rejecting plans

S Hagen

3 00

450 00

02/19/99

Meeting with M Barton, Clarks, N Richardson

J Jardine

100

220 00

02/22/99

Revise letter to D Parry rejecting plans

S Hagen

100

150 00

02/22/99

Discussions with S Hagen, review letter, filings,
attend Pretrial Conference, draft outline of Trial
Brief

J Jardine

50

110 00

04/12/99

Review plans, brief meeting with M Barton

S Hagen

70

115 50

04/13/99

Revise and mail letter to D Parry

S Hagen

10

16.50

04/14/99

Message to N Richardson, draft letter to N
Richardson

S Hagen

.20

33.00

04/15/99

Draft and revise letter to D Parry, read transcript
regarding agreement in court

S Hagen

190

313.50

72 00

S Hagen

.30
.30

49 50

Telephone conference with S Clark regarding
appointment with N Richardson

S Hagen

.10

16 50

04/21/99

Prepare for and attend meeting at N Richardson
office, begin preparing letter to N Richardson

S Hagen

2 90

478 50

04/22/99

Review letters and transcript for letter to N
Richardson, draft and send letter

S Hagen

3 10

51150

04/23/99

Meet with M Barton regarding Ward's plans

S Hagen

99 00

04/28/99

Telephone conference with M Barton regarding
instructions to N Richardson

S Hagen

60
20

04/29/99

Begin drafting additional letter to N Richardson,
telephone conference with M Barton regarding
same

S Hagen

130

214 50

04/30/99

Letter to M Barton regarding permitted uses, revise
letter to N Richardson, telephone conference with
M Barton regarding Monday meeting

S Hagen

3 50

577 50

05/03/99

Finish draft of letter to N Richardson, fax to S
Clark for review, draft letter to M Barton regarding
permitted uses

S Hagen

1 00

165 00

05/04/99

Telephone conference with M Barton regarding
letter to N Richardson

S Hagen

20

33 00

05/13/99

Telephone conference with N Richardson's office

S Hagen

16 50

05/17/99

Read Richardson report, review plans, telephone
conference with S Clark

S Hagen

10
40

05/17/99

Review Richardson letter, discussion with S Clark

J Jardine

05/18/99

Letter to D Parry regarding Richardson report,
telephone conference with M Barton regarding
same, meeting with M Barton regarding same

05/20/99

Meeting with M Barton, edit letter

04/15/99

Discussion with S Hagen, edit letter

J Jardine

04/16/99

Telephone conference with M Barton regarding
letter, telephone conference with D Parry regarding
response to letter

04/19/99

TOTAL

33 00

66 00
48 00

S Hagen

20
50

J Jardine

50

120 00

82 50

$5,446.50

483092
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Exhibit K

FHLEO DISTRICT COURT
Third Judical District
James S. Jardine (1647)
Scott A. Hagen (4840)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main. #500
P. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
(801)532-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

^—

*• • „ M i i

SALtt*«^OUNTY
By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation.

ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO
PAVE PRIVATE ROADWAY

Plaintiff,

v.
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M.
COATS, individually and as Trustees of
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated
December 10. 1985. GREGORY M.
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE
SERVICE. INC., a Utah corporation,
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10.

Civil No. 940905453

Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

This matter came on for a pretrial conference before the Honorable David S. Young on
September 8, 1999. James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as counsel for Plaintiff

0:392

Brighton Corporation. Douglas J. Parry appeared as counsel on behalf of Defendant Gregory
Ward. During the conference, counsel for the parties discussed Brighton Corporation's request
to pave the existing dirt roadway that crosses Defendant Gregory Ward's property, pursuant to
a recorded easement, and leads to Brighton's property. The parties discussed the location of
the roadway, the parties' agreement to amend the legal description of the recorded easement to
include the physical location of the road, and Ward's objection that Brighton should only be
allowed to pave the roadway if it moves its waterline from its present location into the
roadway.
The Court, having determined that the waterline is placed within a separate easement
and that paving the roadway would promote safety and not increase the burden on Ward's
property, concluded that Brighton's request for paving the roadway was reasonable. The
Court further determined that the paving should proceed immediately because of the
approaching winter season.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Brighton Corporation may
immediately proceed to pave the existing private roadway.
DATED this JI

day of September, 1999.

2

OlSftS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF TO PAVE PRIVATE ROADWAY was hand-delivered, on this °\

day of

ry, Esq.
TM\.

ANDERSON & MANSFIELD
jasi South Temple, #1270
J*ke City, Utah 84111

A
492488
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Exhibit L

•UED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

James S. Jardine (1647)
Scott A. Hagen (4840)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main, #500
P. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
(801) 532-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

'3 -399
"S^LT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Ctoffc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING BRIGHTON'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

v.
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M.
COATS, individually and as Trustees of
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M.
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10,

Civil No. 940905453
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bnghton Corporation's ("Brighton") Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
came before the Court for hearing on October 22, 1999. James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen
appeared as counsel on behalf of behalf of Bnghton Corporation. Douglas J. Parry and James
K. Tracy appeared as counsel on behalf of Defendant Gregory M. Ward.

01417

Based on the legal memoranda, including exhibits, filed by both parties in support of
their respective positions, and based on oral argument presented by counsel for both parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. the stipulation stated by counsel on the record on March 3, 1999 and affirmed by
the parties under oath, including the documents referenced in that oral stipulation, comprise a
binding and enforceable contract which is binding on the parties.
2. That contract sets forth the criteria for Mr. Ward's submission of plans to Brighton
Corporation and Brighton Corporation's review of plans submitted by Mr. Ward.
3. Accordingly, the issue to be decided at trial on November 17, and 18, 1999, is
whether the plans submitted by Mr. Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999 complied with
the criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated letters.
4. Based on the foregoing, Brighton Corporation's Motion to Enforce Settlement is
hereby granted.
DATED this

<D

day ofJ>aeberrT999.
BY THE COU

Hon. David
District Cou
Approved as to form:

James K.

n« / 1

Q

Exhibit M

ames S. Jardine (1647)
Scott A. Hagen (4840)
IAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main, #500
?. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
[801) 532-1500
attorneys for Plaintiff

Third .'uc'icial District

\-jT

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By

Depiny Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
V.

ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M.
COATS, individually and as Trustees of
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M.
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10,

Civil No. 940905453
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for bench trial on November 17, 18 and 19, 1999,
the Honorable David S. Young presiding. The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses
and examined the exhibits presented by Plaintiff Brighton Corporation and Defendant Gregory
M. Ward, now issues the following order, which incorporates the Court's findings of fact.

01C90

1.

The parties have entered into a binding settlement agreement that is comprised

of (a) the transcript of hearing dated March 3, 1999, (b) the letter dated October 28, 1998 from
James S. Jardine to Brent D. Ward, (c) the letter dated February 22, 1999 from James S.
Jardine to Douglas J. Parry, and (d) two checklists made up of (i) the "Initial Preliminary Plan
Checklist" and (ii) the "Construction Document Checklist." The checklists are the first six
pages of trial exhibit 4-p. The terms of the settlement are stated in those documents, except
that there are three exceptions to application of the Checklists as stated in the hearing on
March 3, 1999.
2.

The plans at issue in this trial, which were submitted to Brighton Corporation

for review in June 1999, did not comply with the settlement agreement. Accordingly,
Brighton Corporation properly rejected those plans. Brighton correctly determined that the
plans submitted in October 1999 were not properly presented for review and did not review
them. Accordingly, those plans were not considered during the trial.
3.

There was inadequate communication between the parties, which the Court finds

was principally caused by Ward. In particular, the Court finds that both Ward and his
architect, Kimble Shaw, knew that the plans submitted to Brighton Corporation in June 1999
were not final plans, but neither Ward nor Shaw ever advised Brighton of that fact, even after
receiving Brighton's rejection letter dated June 23, 1999, which made clear that Brighton
believed it had reviewed (and rejected) final plans.
4.

The Court finds, based on Mary Barton's scheduled medical treatment out of the

area and on Defendant's stipulation that a four-month period of repose was reasonable under
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the circumstances, that Brighton is entitled to a period of repose from November 19, 1999 until
April 1, 2000, during which no plans shall be submitted to Brighton for review.
5.

Brighton requested, pursuant to the settlement agreement, that Ward remove all

plans currently on file or in the possession of Salt Lake County building and zoning authorities.
The parties are to determine the effect of removing the plans and either remove them or apply
to the Court for further guidance on that issue.
DATED this

3-

day of December, 199ft

Approved as to form:
PARRY, ANDERSON & MANSFIELD

Douglas J. Parry
James K. Tracy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage
prepaid, on this Y ~ day of December, 1999 to the following:
Douglas J. Parry, Esq.
James K. Tracy, Esq.
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD
60 East South Temple, #1270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Exhibit N

FOOTHILLS AND CANYONS OVERLAY ZONE

A.

Lot and Density Requirements

B.

Slope Protection Standards

C.

Grading Standards

D.

Streets / Roads and General Site Access

E.

Driveways

F.

Trail Access

G.

Fences

H.

Tree and Vegetation Protection

I.

Natural Hazards

J.

Stream Corridor and Wetlands Protection

I\L

Wildlife Habitat Protection

L.

S i t e D e v e l o p m e n t and D e s i g n S t a n d a r d s

M.

Traffic

Lot and Density Requirements.
1. General Rule. All development in the Foothills and Canyons Overlay
Zone shall comply with the standards for minimum lot size, minimum
lot width, and maximum density required in the underlying zone
2. Exception to the General Rule-When Underlying Zone Permits Smaller
than 1-Acre Lots.
a. Lots Created After the Effective Date of this Ordinance. If the

Figure 4.

Intrusive Ridgeline Development

Generally

Prohibited

4. Steep Slopes-Open Space. One hundred (100) percent of areas with
slope greater than thirty (30) percent shall remain in natural private or
public open space, except as expressly allowed in this Chapter.

IB Grading Standaxds.
1 Grading Prohibited Without Prior Approvals/Permits. No grading, excavation, or
tree/vegetation removal shall be permitted, whether to provide for a building site,
for on-site utilities or services, or for any roads or driveways, prior to issuance of a
building permit in accordance with a grading and excavation plan and report for the
site approved by the Development Services Engineer.
2 Cutting to Create Benches. Cutting and grading to create benches or pads for
additional or larger building sites shall be avoided to the maximum extent feasible.
(Sec Figures 5 and 6 below.)

Figure 6. Excessive Cutting:

Discouraged

3 Limits on Changing Natural Grade. The original, natural grade of a lot
shall not be raised or lowered more than four (4) feet at anv point for
construction of anv structure or improvement, except:
a The site's original grade may be raised or lowered a maximum
of six (6) feet if retaining walls are used to reduce the
steepness of man-made slopes, provided that the retaining
walls comply with the requirements set forth in this section.
b. The site's original grade may be raised or lowered more than
six (6) feet with terracing, as specified in Section
19.72.030.C8.b.

4. Grading for Accessory Building Pads Discouraged. Separate building
pads for accessory buildings and structures other than garages, such as
tennis courts, swimming pools, outbuildings, and similar facilities, shall
be discouraged except where the natural slope is twenty (20) percent or
less.
5. Limits on Graded or Filled Man-Made Slopes.
a. Slopes of twenty-five (25) percent or less are greatly
encouraged wherever possible.
b. Graded or filled man-made slopes shall not exceed a slope of
fifty (50) percent.
c. Cut man-made surfaces or slopes shall not exceed a slope of
fifty (50) percent unless it is substantiated, on the basis of a
site investigation and submittal of a soils engineering or
geotechnical report prepared and certified by qualified
professional, that a cut at a steeper slope will be stable and
wall not create a hazard to public or private property.
d. All cut, filled, and graded slopes shall be recontoured to the
natural, varied contour of the surrounding terrain.
6. Revegetation Required. Any slope exposed or created in new
development shall be landscaped or revegetated pursuant to the
standards and provisions set forth in Section 19.72.030.H., "Tree and
Vegetation Protection," below.
7. Excavation. Excavation for footings and foundations shall be minimized
to the maximum extent feasible in order to lessen site disturbance and
ensure compatibility with hillside and sloped terrain. Intended
excavation must be supported by detailed engineering plans submitted as
part of the application for site plan approval.
8. Retaining walls. Use of retaining walls is encouraged to reduce the
steepness of man-made slopes and to provide planting pockets conducive
to revegetation. (See Figure 7 below.)
a. Retaining walls may be permitted to support steep slopes but
shall not exceed six (6) feet in height from the finished grade,
except where terraced as specified in subsection (b) below.

b. Terracing shall be limited to two tiers. The width of the
terrace between any two four-foot vertical retaining walls shall
be at least three (3) feet. Retaining walls higher than four (4)
feet shall be separated from any other retaining wall by a
minimum of five (5) horizontal feet. Terraces created between
retaining walls shall be permanently landscaped or
revegetated pursuant to §19.72.030.H., "Tree and Vegetation
Protection," of this Chapter.
c. Retaining walls shall be faced with stone or earth-colored
materials similar to the surrounding natural landscape. (Sec
Chapter 19.73, "Foothills and Canyons Site Development and
Design Standards.")
d. All retaining walls shall comply with the Uniform Building
Code, except that when any provision of this section conflicts
with any provision set forth in the UBC, the more restrictive
provision shall apply.

Figure 7.

4l High Retaining Walls Require 3* Minimum
Horizontal
Separation
Retaining Walls Higher than 4' Require a Minimum
5' of Horizontal
Separation

Filling or Dredging of Waterways Prohibited. Filling or dredging of water
courses, wetlands, gullies, stream beds, or stormwater runoff channels is
prohibited, except that bridge construction is allowed pursuant to the
standards set forth in Section 19.72.030.1.7. below.
10. Detention/Stormwater Facilities. Where detention basins and other
storm and erosion control facilities may be required, any negative visual
and aesthetic impacts on the natural landscape and topography shall be
minimized to the maximum extent feasible. (See Figures 8 and 9.)
(Ord. 966 3, 1986: (part) of Ord. passed 9/25/80: prior code 23-35-4)

